Sacramento regional response guide to radiation emergencies by Wells, Mark A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-09
Sacramento regional response guide to
radiation emergencies
Wells, Mark A.













Approved for public release:  distribution is unlimited 









 Thesis Advisor:                                         Ellen M. Gordon 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sacramento Regional Response Guide to Radiation 
Emergencies 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Mark A. Wells 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District 
2101 Hurley Way 
Sacramento, California, 95825 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release:  distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
          Accidental or intentional release of radiation may result in catastrophic consequences to urban and 
suburban populations. Any emergency response is compromised by insufficiently detailed protocols, and 
qualitative or quantitative wants in equipment and training. These challenges are no less acute for 
Sacramento County which is an archetype of at-risk suburban and urban settings. Recognized standards in 
critical patient care illustrate the need for specific considerations for radiological contaminated patients in a 
response protocol. Current practices in Sacramento require patient decontamination prior to treatment or 
transport. This may adversely affect survival profiles, despite national and international standards which 
specifically provide for consideration of alternative procedures. 
          Radiation responses require a systems approach, whereby all work collaboratively towards a 
common goal. Incident commanders must appreciate their role in a radiation response, and how to 
incorporate the response into a unified multi-jurisdictional, unified command. Additionally, an essential 
component of any radiation response protocol is to decrease the associated “fear” of radiation in the 
general public as well as emergency responders. 
          Best practices research, and recommendations at local, state, national and international levels are 
compiled into a usable radiation response protocol which can be utilized in formulating protocols in 
radiation emergency response. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
115 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Sacramento Regional Radiation Protocol-Emergency Response Agencies-
Local Agency Fire District 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  















































Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
SACRAMENTO REGIONAL RESPONSE GUIDE TO RADIATION 
EMERGENCIES 
 
Mark A. Wells 
Battalion Chief, Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District 
B.S., California State University, Sacramento, 1988 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Dr. Douglas Porch 



























Accidental or intentional release of radiation may result in catastrophic 
consequences to urban and suburban populations. Any emergency response is 
compromised by insufficiently detailed protocols, and qualitative or quantitative wants in 
equipment and training. These challenges are no less acute for Sacramento County which 
is an archetype of at-risk suburban and urban settings. Recognized standards in critical 
patient care illustrate the need for specific considerations for radiological contaminated 
patients in a response protocol. Current practices in Sacramento require patient 
decontamination prior to treatment or transport. This may adversely affect survival 
profiles, despite national and international standards which specifically provide for 
consideration of alternative procedures. 
Radiation responses require a systems approach, whereby all work collaboratively 
towards a common goal. Incident commanders must appreciate their role in a radiation 
response, and how to incorporate the response into a unified multi-jurisdictional, unified 
command. Additionally, an essential component of any radiation response protocol is to 
decrease the associated “fear” of radiation in the general public as well as emergency 
responders. 
Best practices research, and recommendations at local, state, national and 
international levels are compiled into a usable radiation response protocol which can be 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Potential radiological emergencies will task the Sacramento Region of California 
to re-evaluate the current procedures to respond effectively to a large scale radiation 
incident, either caused by an act of radiological terrorism, or by accident.  The lack of 
specific policies addressing triage, treatment and transport of critical patients in the 
aftermath of a radiation event will hamper an effective response.  Additionally, 
insufficient distribution of radiation detection equipment will delay early evaluation of 
radiation exposure to emergency responders.  
Pre-identification of authority and prior coordination of local, state and federal 
stakeholders to mitigate the incident will be addressed in the regional radiation protocol.  
The coordination from the initial response to recovery efforts in the late stage of a 
radiation incident will ensure the effective use of resources, and enhance the efficiency of 
emergency operations. 
The current understanding of responding and treating victims of a radiation 
incident falls within the response to generalized hazardous materials.  The hazardous 
material policy in the Sacramento region requires all contaminated victims of a hazardous 
materials incident to be decontaminated prior to medical treatment or transport.  The 
existing policies are in place to protect the first responders and medical community from 
exposure hazards associated with hazardous materials.  The Sacramento County 
Emergency Medical Service policy number 8029.05 states medical transportation units 
will only accept decontaminated patients from a HAZMAT team, and there are no 
provisions in place to accommodate transportation of critically injured, radiation 
contaminated patients.1 Unlike decontamination procedures required for generalized 
hazardous materials, the critically injured patients at a radiological event must be triaged 
and treated for life threatening injuries prior to initiating time-consuming 
                                                 
1 "Policy 8029.5, Hazardous Materials," in Sacramento County Emergency Medical System Response 
Protocol (February 27, 2004), 
http://www.sacdhhs.com/download/pdfs/ems/ems_Policy%208029.05%20Hazardous%20Materials.pdf. 
[Accessed June 30, 2005]. 
 2
decontamination processes to remediate radiation contamination.2  The existing 
procedures for treating critically injured patients at a radiological event, as called for in 
the current policy, will make it extremely difficult to save the lives of the critically 
injured contaminated patient due to the policies requiring decontamination of all 
contaminated patients prior to transportation to treatment facilities. 
In addition to policy adjustments, the Sacramento Region needs to deploy 
additional initial radiation detection capability and radiation dosimeters to appropriately 
protect first responders.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will investigate the appropriate use of emergency response assets, 
(i.e. equipment and personnel) as well as the appropriate decontamination and recovery 
of those assets, incorporating this information as part of a regional radiation protocol.  
Appropriate preplanning and identification of required procedures necessary to 
decontaminate victims, personnel and equipment will be investigated to reduce confusion 
and anxiety over the presumed loss of assets due to radiation contamination by existing 
policies.  Additionally, the effective utilization of protective clothing ensembles, and 
hasty patient packaging techniques to reduce the likelihood of radiation contamination to 
the first responders, will be important considerations of a revised radiation response 
protocol. 
As part of the radiation response protocol, local, state and federal resources will 
be pre-identified.  In collaboration with the associated responder training, the protocol 
will work to minimize radiation responder concerns associated with radiation exposure, 
treatment of radiation contamination from a first responder perspective, and concerns of 
lost resources due to contaminated assets and fixed facilities.  
A large component in responding to radiation incidents is to minimize the fear 
associated with radiation both in the response community and the public at large.   
 
                                                 
2  U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Domestic Preparedness. Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) Radiation/Nuclear Course for Hazardous Materials Technicians, Student 
Manual, version 5.1 (Washington, D.C.: Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland 
Security, n.d.), 9-5. 
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Research as to the science of the radiological threat and strategies to educate responders 
as well as the public as to the associated hazards are an integral part of the response 
protocol.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROJECT 
The immediate and long-term ramifications of an interoperable regional 
emergency response protocol, to be used in planning, response and in the aftermath of a 
radiological accident or intentional radiation attack will equate to more lives saved, 
reduced anxiety for responders and facilitate effective operations in a radiation 
emergency.   
As part of the radiation response protocol, local, state and federal recovery 
resources will be identified, and in concert with training, will alleviate concern of cost 
recovery associated with contaminated transportation assets and fixed facilities.  The 
clarification of recovery stage cost reimbursement, and decontamination procedures will 
reduce the confusion and potential on-scene debate over which resources will be used.  
The development of the radiation response protocol in Sacramento will potentially be 
applicable to other regions of the country, furthering the radiation response capability 
throughout the nation. 
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II. RADIATION RESPONSE SCENARIOS 
A. POTENTIAL RESPONSE SCENARIOS 
The emergency response to a radiation event can be anticipated in several 
scenarios: 
• Industrial accidents during normal day-to-day handling, or transportation 
of radioactive materials. 
• Intentional sabotage of storage or transportation vessels containing 
radioactive materials for malicious purpose.  This may include nuclear 
facilities such as, power plants, or industrial facilities.3 
• Detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon such as nuclear artillery shells, 
land mines, “suit case” bombs, etc.  Tactical nuclear weapons from the 
former Warsaw Pact countries arsenal could theoretically be used 
conventionally by terrorist groups if they fall into the wrong hands.  
“Russia continues to deploy a number of its most portable nuclear 
weapons on its front lines, where security controls are the weakest.”4  
• The distribution of radioactive materials via a “dirty bomb” (Radiation 
Dispersal Device).  The term “dirty bomb” is a slang term, originated by 
the news media, and used to describe a radioactive material packaged with 
explosives for the intended purpose of spreading radiation.5   
• Radiation Exposure Device that consists of a radiation source positioned 
to expose unsuspecting victims to harmful levels of radiation. 
• Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)-the formation of a nuclear-yield 
reaction that can be an improvised weapon with acquired nuclear 
materials, or modification to a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon.6  
                                                 
3 Charles D. Ferguson et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Calif.: Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), 3. 
4 Ibid., 1. 
5 Health Physics Society, "Guidance for Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event," 
http://hps.org/hsc/documents/wmd_factsheet.pdf [Accessed July 2, 2005]. 
6 Ibid. 
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• Improvised methods of distributing radiation by utilizing liquid sprayers 
or other mechanical means to spread radiation contamination.  
B. TYPES OF RADIATION AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
Alpha Radiation:  Particulate cat ion, consisting of two protons and two neutrons 
which will not pass through a piece of paper or the dead layer of intact skin.  Alpha 
radiation travels approximately 1-2 inches in air and is primarily an internal inhalation or 
absorption hazard. 
Beta Radiation:  Smaller than alpha particles, beta radiation can, depending on 
their energy, travel up to 10 feet in air, and can penetrate the intact skin, making beta 
radiation both an external and internal hazard.  Shielding can be accomplished with 
plastic, glass, and foil.  
Gamma and X-rays:  Electromagnetic radiation, that travels at the speed of light.  
Shielding can be accomplished by dense material such as lead, steel, and concrete.  
Gamma radiation can easily penetrate protective clothing; therefore gamma radiation is 
considered an external and internal exposure hazard. 
Neutron Radiation:  High-speed particulate matter traveling at close to the speed 
of light.  There are only limited numbers of radionuclides that are natural emitters of 
neutron radiation.  Neutron radiation is associated with a nuclear fission event such as a 
detonation of a nuclear weapon.  Deposits energy in hydrogenous materials such as fat 
and water, and thus, it is an external and internal radiation hazard. 
C. TERMINOLOGY FOR FIRST RESPONDERS REGARDING RADIATION 
Electromagnetic radiation: Is defined by the modular emergency response 
radiological transportation training program (MERRTT) as visible light, heat, radio 
waves, and microwaves which are low level radiation energy which is referred to as non-
ionizing radiation.  High energy radiation is referred to as ionizing radiation.  Ionizing 
radiation is of sufficient energy to eject an electron from an atom, thereby changing the 
electron configuration of the atom and thus its chemical properties. This is the initiating 
event that can ultimately lead to biological damage and the potential adverse health 
consequences of ionizing radiation. 
 7
Radiation physical half-life (Tp1/2):  the time required for a quantity of a 
radionuclide to decay (i.e., transform) by one-half. Some radionuclides have a Tp1/2 of a 
few hours (e.g. Tc-99m used widely in Nuclear Medicine- Tp1/2=6 hrs), or many years 
(e.g. Cs-137 used in instrument calibration facilities Tp1/2-30 yrs and U-238 found in 
nature Tp1/2= 4.5 billion years.7  
Radioactive material: Any material that spontaneously emits ionizing radiation.8 
Radioactive contamination: Radioactive material where it is not intended.9  
ALARA: Acronym for "as low as (is) reasonably achievable." Means making 
every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to ionizing radiation as far below the dose 
limits as practical, taking into account the state of technology, the cost of incremental 
reductions in dose, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, regarding the  
utilization of radioactive material in the public interest 
Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE):  The sum of the internal and external 
doses of radiation exposure. 
Inverse Square Law: The relationship that states that electromagnetic radiation 
intensity is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from a point source. Thus 
reducing the distance from a radiation source by 1/2 increases the exposure rate four 
times.  The same law works in reverse, whereby increasing the distance from a radiation 
source by a factor of 2 reduces the exposure rate four fold. 
Fissile Material: Any material in which neutrons can cause a fission reaction. The 
three primary fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239. 
Low Specific Activity (LSA): Radioactive material with limited amounts of 
radioactivity relative to the amount of the material.  An example would be uranium or 
thorium ores, mill tailings or contaminated earth.10  
                                                 
7Health Physics Society, "Guidance for Protective Actions,” 2-7.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 2-8. 
10 U.S. Department of Energy, “Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training 
(MERRTT) Student Guide” (May 2006), 8-7. 
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Special form radioactive material: Can be either a single, solid piece of material, 
or a sealed capsule that can be opened only by destroying the capsule.  Special form 
material is considered to be non-dispersible during accident conditions. 11  Special form 
material should not be confused with “Special Nuclear Material” which is plutonium, 
uranium-233, or uranium enriched in isotopes uranium-233 or urnium-235.12 
Surface contaminated objects: Solid object that is not radioactive in of itself, but 
has radioactive contamination on its surface. 
D. MEASUREMENT TERMINOLOGY 
First responders must understand that radiation is measured for different 
applications and purposes.  Additionally, like unit measurements for distance, weight and 
temperature, there are different units of measurements for radiation utilized throughout 
industry both domestically and internationally.  Emergency responders must understand 
the difference in order to reference and respond to radiation incidents appropriately.    
There is terminology that is based on the English system which is used primarily in the 
United States, and the international system (SI) which is used commonly in the rest of the 
world.   
The English system of measurement utilizes the roentgen equivalent man (rem) as 
the measurement of radiation energy deposited in man and roentgen (R) to measure 
radiation exposure in air.  Radiation absorbed dose (rad) is the unit for measuring 
absorbed dose in any material.  The international unit of measurement for radiation 
energy deposited in man is the Sievert (Sv), and the international unit for absorbed dose 
in a material is the Gray (Gy).13   
• For emergency response purposes, these term may be considered to be 
approximately equal to one another (i.e., 1 R = 1 rem = 1 rad). 
• 1 Sv = 100 rem  
                                                 
11 Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response, 8-7. 
12 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Special Nuclear Material,” http://www.nrc.gov/material/sp-
nucmaterials.html, [Accessed September 3, 2006]. 
13 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Domestic Preparedness, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Radiation/Nuclear Course for Hazardous Materials Technicians, 
Student Manual, Version 5.1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), 2-23. 
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• 1 Gy = 100 rad. 
• The terms Curie (Ci) and Becquerels (Bq) are used to measure the amount of 
radioactivity which is the number of decay events or disintegrations a quantity of 
radioactive material undergoes in a certain period of time.  The Ci is utilized by 
the English system and is a large quantity of radioactive material equal to 3.7 x 
1010  disintegrations per second.  The Bq is a much smaller quantity of radioactive 
material equal to 1 disintegration per second.  UN placarding and labeling utilizes 
the Bq to indicate the quantity of radioactive material, but sometimes has the Ci 
equivalent in parenthesis next to the Bq value. 
It is important to note that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) utilizes the SI 
units, so clarification of terminology utilizing units of measurement between local 
responders and DOD assets will need to be confirmed to minimize confusion or 
misinterpretation of reported measurements of radiation.  
E. AVAILABLE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS FOR POTENTIAL 
TERRORIST ATTACKS 
There are an estimated 10,000 radioactive sources throughout the world that 
exceed 1,000 curies, and an estimated one thousand sources that exceed 100,000 curies.14  
To put these numbers into perspective, an unshielded 25-gram source of Cs-137 would 
have a dose rate of 1,000 rem/hr at one meter, thus resulting in a lethal exposure in one 
hour .15  If this same material was spread over a ten square block area in a metropolitan 
area, the dose rate would be less than 1 rem/yr.16  It should be noted that there are some 
large sources exceeding 220,000 curies used in large food irradiation units that if spread 
in the above mentioned example, would still result in dangerous doses rates even if 
distributed over the 100 square blocks mentioned in the previous example.17  
                                                 
14 James L. Conca and Michael H. Reynolds, "Dirty Bombs, Practical Plans," in Homeland Protection 
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III. ROLE OF THE FIRST RESPONDER 
The events of 9/11 have necessitated that the emergency response 
community take a critical look at existing response programs, and develop 
a systems approach for the future.  Terrorist groups will continue to 
attempt to obtain WMD material with the goal of attacking targets in the 
U.S.  Consequently, response assets must be prepared to respond.  We no 
longer have the luxury of reach back with six or seven hour response 
times.  As so often is the case, local first responders are the key.  
Emergency responders will be the first on the scene where decisions made 
in the initial stages of the incident will contribute greatly the overall 
success of the response effort. They must be given the capability to detect 
radiological materials and be provided with timely technical information 
and evacuation advice.18  
The term “systems” approach is understood by the author to mean a collaborative, 
multi-discipline approach to complex emergency response scenarios.  Response protocols 
must incorporate all stakeholder agencies.  Individual response protocols that do not 
incorporate, and identify all responding agencies roles and responsibilities will be 
ineffective. 
A. TERRORISM VERSUS ACCIDENTAL RADIATION RESPONSE 
Response to a radiation accident differs from response to a radiological terrorist 
attack.  Accidents generally happen in radiation facilities where there is resident expertise 
and pre-planned response guidelines for specific releases of known radionuclides.  Often 
there is a great deal of time in anticipation of the accident to activate pre-developed 
response plans.19  Radioactive materials involved in accidents are generally well 
identified and the hazard is immediately known once an accident occurs.  Both the 
transportation routes and location of fixed facilities  for large radioactive sources are 
located in areas where accidents, generally, will impact the least amount of people.20  
                                                 
18 John M. McBroom, "How the DOE/NNSA nuclear and biological search and response capability 
and the first responders across the nation can work together," testimony in House Armed Services 
Committee (Washington, D.C., March 5, 2002), 
http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressrelease/107thcongress/02-03-05mcb [Accessed July 
2, 2005]. 
19 "Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents," Federal Register 71, no. 1 (January 3, 2006): 175. 
20 Ibid. 
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Conversely, terrorist attacks will be intentionally committed in areas where the most 
impact will occur.  The radionuclide or quantity will not be immediately known, and will 
remain unknown until responders arrive on scene with appropriate equipment to evaluate 
the hazard and protective actions will be needed immediately without notice. 
A terrorist attack, utilizing a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device, would 
most likely be initiated at the surface, which will cause a tremendous amount of radiation 
fallout.21 Without a specific radiation response plan, emergency workers may find 
themselves over committed in the contaminated area, becoming contaminated and 
exposed to harmful radiation levels.  “Response techniques, therefore, must be modified 
so that emergency responders are able to protect themselves while saving as many lives 
as possible.”22  
B. DETECTION/DOSE MONITORING 
The early notification and accurate assessment of a radiological event will be 
paramount in the management of a radiation emergency.  In the Sacramento Region, The 
Sacramento City Fire Department, Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District, Folsom Fire 
District, Elk Grove Fire District, West Sacramento Fire Department, and the Roseville 
Fire Department have been issued “pager style” radiation dosimeters to detect gamma 
radiation during the initial response to an emergency.  The distribution of radiation pagers 
has not been consistent throughout the aforementioned fire department agencies within 
the operational area.  Some fire agencies have inexplicably elected to retain their 
dosimeters to be deployed in the event of a declared radiological emergency.  This clearly 
is going to be too late for their initial responders, who may be unaware of the presence of 
radiation environment during initial assessment of an incident.  The Sacramento 
Metropolitan Fire District has placed the dosimeters on all first response vehicles 
including front-line engines, trucks, medics, battalion chief and assistant chief vehicles.  
Additionally, procurement and distribution of radiological dosimeters to the area law 
enforcement agencies is necessary. The California Highway Patrol has deployed radiation 
detection equipment to their commercial enforcement units, but none of the other CHP 
                                                 
21 Ferguson et al., Four Faces, 91. 
22 Ibid. 
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assets (i.e., patrol vehicles); nor the City of Sacramento Police Department; Sacramento 
County Sheriff’s Department; Citrus Heights Police Department; Rancho Cordova Police 
Department; Folsom Police Department; or the Elk Grove Community Services District 
Police Department, are equipped with radiation detection equipment.  Additionally, the 
private ambulance providers have not procured early radiation detection capability at the 
current time.  These assets will potentially be the first arriving emergency resources on 
scene, and need to have the early radiation detection capability to ensure the proper 
protective actions and notifications are made during the initial stages of a radiation 
incident.  These dosimeters will be deployed in the same manner as those deployed by the 
area fire agencies.  Initially, the implementation of a pilot initiative to distribute the 
dosimeters and related training to area law enforcement officers will be implemented per 
the attached Strategic Plan Appendix.  It is the intent of a regional strategic protocol to 
facilitate radiation detection/dosimeters to all first responder apparatus in the region.  
This includes all law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS) vehicles. 
C. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 
Structural firefighting clothing, in combination with a full face respirator or self 
contained breathing apparatus, offers protection from alpha and beta radiation.23  
Additionally, area fire departments have been issued chemically resistive PPE ensembles 
for use in WMD environments, and for decontamination operations in a chemical 
hazardous material incident involving chemical hazards. Area law enforcement has 
procured level “C” protective clothing ensembles increasing their initial safety and 
response capability.  The private ambulance providers, per the Sacramento County 
Emergency Medical Service policy, do not operate in hazardous environments; therefore, 
these resources do not require personal protective clothing beyond universal precautions 
for radiation incidents. As mentioned previously, it is necessary for private ambulance 
providers to be equipped with radiation detection equipment to provide initial detection 
of radiation on an emergency scene.  Therefore, the author recommends utilizing regional 
fire-based EMS transportation assets for triage, treatment and transportation of 
radiological patients in hazardous areas due to the availability of PPE that is carried by 
                                                 
23 Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response, mod 9-9. 
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firefighters staffing the units.  Private ambulance providers will function in the support 
zone once a radiation emergency is declared.  Additionally, the Sacramento County 
Emergency Medical Service policy, needs to be amended to incorporate changes 
recommended in the regional radiation response protocol.  
D. OPERATING GUIDELINES FOR RADIATION RESPONSE24  
• Defining the hot zone is the most important first response, and a simple alarming 
dosimeter is the most useful piece of equipment for initial radiation response. 
• By following emergency response protocols for radiation, that are aligned with 
nationally recognized standards for allowable dose rates to radiation for 
emergency response, first responders can operate safely in the initial phase of a 
radiation incident. 
• The greater the dispersion of material, the greater the affected area, but the lower 
the radiation dose rate. 
• Individuals with no significant physical injuries should not be significantly 
contaminated.  
• Firefighting PPE will be sufficient protection for alpha and beta radiation, nothing 
will be practical to wear to protect from gamma radiation.  Utilizing time, 
distance and source shielding is the most practical approach to protection from  
gamma radiation. 
Early detection is critical, but the radiation dose monitoring of first responders is 
also important to ensure their doses are kept within safe ranges during the incident. 
                                                 
24 Conca and Reynolds, "Dirty bombs,” 18. 
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Figure 1.   Response Worker Guidelines25 
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 *For potential doses>10 rems, special medical monitoring programs should be employed, and 
exposure should be tracked in terms of the unit of absorbed dose (rad) rather than TEDE (rem). 
 **In the case of a very large incident such as an IND, incident commanders may need to consider 
raising the property and lifesaving response worker guidelines in order to prevent further loss of life and 
massive spread of destruction. 
Advancements in personal dosimeters makes available instant, self-reading 
instruments that do not require external power supplies and are capable of measuring 
wide dose ranges (0.001-1,000 rem).  Currently, the area fire departments are equipped 
with SAIC PD-3 pager style dosimeters, and Canberra dosimeters that alarm at 1 mR/hr 
or 100 mR of dose.  Rapidly advancing technologies are emerging to include alarming 
dosimeters which have visual aids to aid responders in determining radiation rates and 
doses.  The experience of the author in educating first responders in radiation response 
has found their familiarity with radiation related subjects to be short-lived.  The “short-
lived” memory of responders highlights the need for easy method for easy to use devices 
that enable the responders to rapidly assess radiation hazards and thereby predict 
sustained operation time lines in contaminated environments. Dosimeters that not only 
give accurate rates and doses, but reinforce safety margins by computing safe work 
durations, will be valuable potentially enhancing user confidence thereby reducing the 
fear and anxiety of working in a radioactively contaminated environment.   
                                                 
25 "Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides.” 
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A self-reading/alarming dosimeter must be worn by a supervising member of each 
unit working in a radiation contaminated environment for the purposes of dose tracking 
of unit personnel and to alert when dangerous levels are encountered during initial 
operations requiring personnel to enter radioactive fields to perform emergency duties 
such as rescue, or firefighting operations.  The deployment of the dosimeter will be the 
responsibility of the supervisor or senior crew member if a supervisor is not assigned. To 
the extent possible, the dosimeter should be in the closest proximity to the highest 
activity source to ensure the dose reflected is the maximum dose.  These measurements 
will be valuable in dose reconstruction efforts after the initial emergency is contained to 
account for each member working in the exclusion zone during initial emergency 
operations.   
Additionally, the utilization of thermo luminescence dosimeters (TLD) may be 
beneficial to track long term exposure for individuals working in the contaminated areas 
during the intermediate and later phases of the incident.  Regional hazardous material 
response team (HMRT) policies require all hazmat personnel to carry individual 
dosimeters for dose tracking purposes.  HMRT personnel will be working in the most 
contaminated areas, but support personnel such as law enforcement officers, EMS and 
fire personnel will need to have dose tracking capability as well.  It is not financially 
practical to purchase hundreds of alarming dosimeters, but the utilization of TLD’s may 
be an affordable alternative.  In the short term, most municipalities maintain old civil 
defense equipment including pencil dosimeters.  If the units are deemed to be serviceable, 
these dosimeters might be incorporated into a long-term dose tracking strategy. Available 
pencil dosimeters, in addition to TLD’s should be retained in mobile stockpiles, such as 
the homeland security supply trailers which are deployed strategically throughout the 
region for response to large-scale incidents, to include large scale radiation emergencies.  
These resources will be brought to the incident during the initial phases by urban area 
security initiative (UASI) personnel and/or special operations personnel having regional 
homeland security responsibility, such as members of the terrorism early warning group 
and or the regional hazardous materials coordinators.  
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E. DOSE RATES DURING THE COURSE OF THE INCIDENT 
It should be noted that once a dose has been received, there is no further 
protective actions to administer for that dose.  An interesting way to evaluate an action 
response with a radiation exposure is to ask the question: “How much radiation dose will 
be avoided by taking the action as compared to taking no action at all.”26  
The protective action guideline (PAG) establishes four criteria that should be met 
during the first two phases of the radiation emergency, the early and intermediate phases 
respectively. 
• Acute health affects due to radiation exposure should be avoided; 
• Chronic health effects should not exceed a level that is judged to be 
acceptable during an emergency; 
• Any reduction of risk to public health, achievable at acceptable cost, 
should be done; 
• The risk to health from protective actions should not exceed the risk to the 
health from the dose avoided.27 
1. Recovery (Late) Phase 
During the recovery phase of a radiological incident, dose rates will become a 
potential source of controversy and debate based on the lack of definitive standards or 
recommendations for acceptable post-event radiation dose rates.  The concept of ALARA 
(As low as reasonably achievable) will be the basis by which the dose rates will be 
determined in the late phase.  These recommended dose levels will take into 
consideration both economic and social factors.28   
                                                 
26 Health Physics Society, "Background Information on ‘Guidance for Protective Actions Following a 
Radiological Terrorist Event’ Position Statement of the Health Physics Society*," 




F. POPULATION MONITORING 
“The term ‘population monitoring’ is made up of immediate monitoring after an 
incident and long term monitoring for health effects from the attack.”29  The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), as outlined in the National 
Response Plan, has tasked the U.S. Center for Disease Prevention (CDC) with being the 
lead agency responsible for population monitoring.30  CDC is also responsible for 
supporting local, state and tribal governments regarding decontamination of internal 
contamination, and providing guidance as to pharmaceuticals to remove internal 
contamination from the bodies of victims.31  
G. DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 
Dose reconstruction is utilized to provide estimated radiation dose exposures to 
individuals or populations in the aftermath of a radiation incident where dose monitoring 
was unavailable, incomplete or inconsistent.32 Dose reconstructions may be utilized, for 
example, in the aftermath of a dirty bomb attack to estimate the accumulated dose to 
civilians in the immediate vicinity of the blast or directly affected by the radioactive 
plume.  First responders, without sufficient early detection capability such as alarming 
dosimeters, would rely on dose reconstruction performed by radiation experts to assist in 
determining potential exposure prior to the arrival of detection or monitoring equipment.   
According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
Fact Sheet, dose reconstruction may include analysis of data such as:33 
• Internal dosimeter data developed from urinalysis, or in vivo measurement 
• External dosimeter data collected from film badges, dosimeter readings etc. 
• Monitoring of the effected area with air samples or site surveys 
• Solubility studies and particle size measurements 
                                                 
29 Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
“Population Monitoring After a Release of Radioactive Material" (June 2005): 1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Department of Health and Human Services (NIOSH), "NIOSH Fact Sheet: What a Claimant Should 
Know About Radiation Dose Reconstruciton,"1.  www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/pdfs/misc/2002-138.pdf. 
[Accessed May 29, 2006]. 
33 Ibid. 
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• Process descriptions for work areas or control zones.  
“If individuals’ radiation exposures were monitored using present-day technology 
and consisted of only external radiation exposure, dose reconstruction would be very 
simple.  It might only require summing the radiation doses recorded from radiation 
badges and adding estimated potential ‘missed’ doses resulting from the limits of 
detection monitoring badges (devices) used.”34  For trained first responders who utilize 
universal precautions, avoiding ingesting, inhalation or absorption of radioactive 
contamination, dose reconstruction will be effective in predicting the exposure to these 
personnel.  Once radiation detection and monitoring equipment arrives, the 
documentation as to time and place of personnel on scene prior to arrival of equipment, 
plus the doses measured by dosimeters, once in operation will, provide an accurate 
estimate of individual exposure.  Additional information will be necessary to ensure these 
estimates are correct such as: 
• Determining specific characteristics of the monitoring procedures 
• Identify activities of personnel where monitoring did not take place 
• Specific nature of the radionuclide involved 
H. SHELTERING IN PLACE VERSUS EVACUATION 
The Health Physics Society recommends, in the initial phase (early phase) of a 
radiation incident due to terrorism, sheltering in place will be the most likely 
recommendation. Pre-warning will be very limited.  Persons evacuating into a plume will 
be exposed to potentially more radiation than if they shelter inside buildings.  In an 
industrial accident, more advanced warning may be available; therefore, evacuation in 
advance of a plume is the recommended course of action.35  
I. HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) 
SYSTEMS 
Large HVAC systems are complex and generally are controlled by building 
engineers.  The feasibility of being able to shut down a large system in the aftermath of a 
radiological terrorist attack is minimal unless the system was incorporated into an early 
                                                 
34 Department of Health and Human Services (NIOSH), "NIOSH Fact Sheet.” 
35 Health Physics Society, “Background Information," 11. 
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detection system as scene in some “metro detection” systems.36  High efficiency 
particulate air (HEPA) filters in the ducting systems will be effective filters for most 
radiation particles.37  Small systems that can be shut down with minimal time delay, such 
as individual office buildings or residential systems should be shut down. 
J. INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPIRATORY PROTECTION 
OF EXPOSED POPULATIONS 
Emergency response personnel shall wear self contained breathing apparatus until 
atmospheric monitoring indicates downgrading to an air purifying respirator mask, or a 
dust mask (N95 at the minimum) based on oxygen concentration and air sampling data.  
Victims or responders caught in a radiological plume should make attempts to minimize 
the inhalation of radiological contamination.  Ideally, this information should be available 
in the pre-incident education strategies, or techniques will not be known until after 
inhalation of contamination has occurred.  The following recommendations are proposed: 
• Cover the mouth and nose with a dry cloth or handkerchief.38  “In some cases, 
wet material could actually enhance the amount of inhaled particles.” 39 
• There are recommendations to remove the improvised protection after thirty 
minutes following detonation.40  The conditions on scene will ultimately dictate 
when improvised protection can be removed.  The churning of dust due to erratic 
wind patterns in urban areas or vehicular/pedestrian traffic may cause re-agitation 
of settled dust causing conditions requiring the maintained use of improvised 
respiratory protection.  
                                                 
36Conca and Reynolds, "Dirty Bombs,” 22. 
37 James L. Conca, Michael H. Reynolds, "Dirty bombs, practical plans," Homeland Protection 
Professional Magazine (May 2006): 22. 
38 Stephen V. Musolino and Frederick T. Harper, Emergency Response Guidance for the First 48 





IV. MEDICAL TRIAGE, TREATMENT AND TRANSPORT OF 
RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED PATIENTS 
The international, national and state standards of responding to a radiological 
incident provide for the immediate treatment of critical patients, this medical response 
has priority over decontamination.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
states,  
In virtually all cases there will be little or no health risk to response 
personnel provided that, for response actions near any hazardous material, 
they follow the General part of the Personal Protection Guidelines.  There 
would not be a health hazard to medical staff treating or transporting of 
contaminated persons provided that they protect themselves against the 
inadvertent ingestion of radioactive material by the use of normal barrier 
methods (use of surgical gloves and mask) and take actions to prevent the 
spread of contamination (e.g., to cover the patient in a blanket or sheet), 
remove and store outer clothing.41 
National standards stated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Emergency 
Response Guidebook, guide page 163 states under “First Aid,” the need to address 
medical considerations primarily in radiation incidents. 
Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns; Use first aid 
treatment according to the nature of the injury; Do not delay care and 
transport of a seriously injured person; Injured persons contaminated by 
contact with released material are not a serious hazard to health care 
personnel, equipment or facilities; and Ensure that medical personnel are 
aware of the material(s) involved, take precautions to protect themselves 
and prevent spread of contamination.42 
The California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) also states that the need to 
treat and transport critical patients predominates over decontamination concerns.  
“Exposure to radioactive contamination is very seldom life threatening.  Medical 
attention to injuries should always take precedence over decontamination.”43 
                                                 
41  International Atomic Energy Agency, “Generic procedures for response to a radiological 
emergency,” in Part 1, Manual for First Responders and Local response, Rev. 16.2 (Vienna, Austria: 
IAEA, 2004): 18. 
42 U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, 2004 
Emergency Response Guidebook (n.p., n.d.), 163. 
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As demonstrated above, the priority of medical treatment radiological victims 
over decontamination is well defined in guidelines at the international, national and state 
levels.  Training and cooperation at the local level emergency responders will be the key 
element of developing a regional response protocol that properly addresses contaminated 
patient issues.   
The Sacramento County Emergency Medical System protocols do not have a 
clear delineation of response in regards to a radiation emergency.  Policy number 8029.05 
clearly states that pre-hospital care providers, including transporting ambulances will 
only accept decontaminated patients from the HAZMAT Team. “ALL patients will 
undergo primary decontamination at the scene.  There are no indications to transport 
contaminated patients.”44 
Sacramento County is not the only area of the state that has language addressing 
generalized hazardous materials without specifically addressing radiation.  The County of 
Santa Clara Emergency Medical Services Agency, Policy 610 states, “All potentially 
contaminated patients must be properly decontaminated by the trained HAZMAT 
responders before emergency medical responders can administer medical treatment or 
transport the patients to an emergency medical facility.” 45 
A. PATIENT TRIAGE 
The initial assessment and triage of patients in a radiological environment will be 
assigned to first arriving emergency units utilizing the Sacramento County mass casualty 
protocol. Upon detection of a radiation incident, emergency personnel will don 
appropriate protective clothing at the direction of the incident commander and radiation 
detection/dosimeter equipment.  Patients will be assessed for medical needs, regardless of 
radiological contamination utilizing the simple triage and rapid treatment (START) triage 
method. 
 
43 "Mass Casualty Decontamination, Guidance Document for Field Responders (Working Draft)" 
(California Specialized Training Institute, 5-14-01), 164. 
44 "Mass Casualty Decontamination,” 164. 
45 Private EMS Response: Hazardous Materials, Policy 610 (San Jose: County of Santa Clara, 
Emergency Medical Services Agency, 2004), 3. 
http://www.sccbuilding.org/scc/assets/doc/804278Prehospital%20Care%20Manual%202005-
%20050204.pdf. [Accessed July 4, 2005]. 
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B. TREATMENT 
Critical patients will be stabilized prior to decontamination efforts.  Delayed and 
minor patients will be decontaminated prior to treatment and/or transportation provided 
the time delay to facilitate decontamination does not exacerbate their medical condition.. 
C. TRANSPORTATION 
The transport of immediate patients whether contaminated or not will not be 
delayed for decontamination actions provided that there is not a chemical component to 
the contamination.  (Chemically contaminated patients will be decontaminated prior to 
treatment or transportation.  Unlike radiation contamination, chemical contamination 
does potentially pose a primary hazard to medical care providers.) Every effort to 
minimize the spread of radiation contamination will be made so long as the efforts do not 
delay transportation or medical treatment timelines.  Such techniques may include the 
removal of a patients clothing to remove as much contamination as possible.  Patients 
shall be wrapped in sheets to trap any remaining contamination and transportation assets 
will be prepared per MERRTT procedures to minimize contamination.  The use of an 
issued radiation dosimeter will be utilized by ambulance crew members, (one per unit) to 
ensure radiation dose limits do not exceed recommended EPA standards.  The dosimeter 
shall be placed in the treatment area of the ambulance to ensure the device is protecting 
personnel in the closest proximity to the potential radiation contamination.  Ambulance 
personnel shall don, at a minimum, universal precautions PPE to include eye protection, 
respiratory protection, gloves and an outer disposable garment to enhance 
decontamination processes.  Utilization of PPE ensembles that have been developed as 
biological PPE will facilitate the protective requirements for radiation emergencies in 
addition to biological emergencies.  Utilizing the time, distance and shielding principles, 
personnel will reduce exposure to radiation to ALARA.  
Command staff should consider the utilization of dedicated “dirty” ambulances on 
an on-going basis, providing the contamination level of the resource does not exceed safe 
radiation exposure levels for personnel.  It should be noted that the dedication of “dirty 
ambulances should only be utilized if it does not delay the transport of critical patients 
due to a limited response capability.  Limiting the number of ambulances and personnel 
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that may require decontamination will ensure continuity of medical transport capability 
immediately following the incident and is consistent with the ALARA principle. 
Radiation contamination of an ambulance can be removed during cleanup or remediation 
efforts.  Often ordinary clean-up procedures will remove radioactive contamination.46  
Exposed personnel and equipment will be surveyed for radiological contamination and 
exposure levels recorded prior to being release from duty, or reassigned. 
D. DECONTAMINATION 
The nature of each event will dictate a course of action regarding the radiation 
decontamination procedures necessary.  The following are guidelines to be balanced with 
specific incident considerations.  Incident specific considerations may include, but are not 
limited to; weather conditions, ambient temperature, additional hazardous 
materials/hazards associated with the incident, and the logistical concerns of 
decontaminating large volumes of people in an expedient manner, and the geographic 
magnitude of the area of involvement. 
• If resources allow, initial radiological survey procedures should be performed by 
trained personnel to detect contamination.    Personnel surveys can be performed 
at the direction of hazardous materials response team personnel.  Additionally, 
transportable radiation monitors called “portal monitors” may be used for the 
screening of large numbers of victims.  Portal monitors can be accessed through 
the U.S. Department of Energy Radiation Assistance Program (RAP) teams or the 
National Guard Civil Support Teams.  Commanders must factor a time delay of 
specialized detection equipment into response planning processes.  Additionally, 
improvisation may be required to survey large numbers of concerned people.  The 
utilization of radiation detection equipment found in the private sector may be 
utilized with proper coordination/collaboration with civilian infrastructure.  An 
example would be the use of metal scrap yard radiation monitors. These facilities 
may become remote radiation survey centers utilized to minimize public hysteria 
or fear due to the possibility of being contaminated.                                                   
46Jerrold T. Bushberg, Linda A. Kroger, Marcia B. Hartman, Edwin M. Leidholdt, Jr., Kenneth L. 
Miller, Robert Derlet, and Cheryl Wraa, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism:  Emergency Department 
Management of Radiation Casualties,” Journal of Emergency Medicine (University of California Davis 
Health System, in press),  17. 
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• Decontamination/radiation survey personnel must be made aware of the 
possibility that there may be people with internal radioactive material that is 
present because of medical diagnosis or treatment.  Radioactive isotopes are often 
utilized as part of routine medical procedures.  Such radionuclides will be 
detected by survey equipment utilized by emergency personnel.  Routine medical 
history inquiries will illuminate the legitimacy of the presence of these 
radiopharmaceuticals.  Additionally, field personnel will not be able to 
decontaminate internal radiation contamination.  Persons with internal radiation 
contamination should be referred to medical authorities for follow-up medical 
treatment.  
• Recommendations for decontamination are made by the decontamination unit 
leader to the hazardous materials group supervisor. These recommendations are to 
be submitted to the incident commander at the unified command center.  
Decontamination procedures minimize off-site consequences of radiological 
contamination.  The decision to utilize wet versus dry procedures will incorporate 
environmental factors, numbers of affected victims, nature of the contamination 
and resources available to perform decontamination.  The following 
decontamination control procedures are illustrated in the “Pre-Hospital Practices” 
module from the MERRTT program.47    
1. Field Decontamination of Immediate Triaged Patients Who Have Not 
Undergone a Formal Decontamination Process 
• Initiate ALS care as necessary 
• Remove clothing if appropriate 
• Wrap patient in a blanket to minimize contamination 
• Only expose areas required to assess and treat patient 
• If necessary, cut and remove the patients clothing away from the body 
being careful to avoid contamination to the unexposed skin 
• Properly contain all removed clothing by placing it in a sealable bag 
• Continue to reassess and monitor vitals while in route to a medical facility 
                                                 
47 Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response, 16-6. 
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• Contact with the patient may result in transfer of contamination, so change 
gloves as necessary 
2. Dry Field Decontamination 
• Dry field decontamination should be the first line of contamination 
control, and is performed in the contamination reduction zone, formerly 
known as the “warm zone,” for patients that do not meet “immediate 
patient criteria. 
• Removes the majority of contaminates  
• Reduces the risks of contamination spread and inhalation hazard 
• Allows contaminates to be left in the affected area 
 
Formalized Decontamination efforts to reduce the spread of decontamination will 
be done in accordance with the Sacramento Regional Decontamination Protocol. 
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V. MEDICAL FACILITY PREPARATION AND MEDICAL 
INTERVENTION FOR CONTAMINATED PATIENTS 
A. HOSPITAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ADDRESSING RADIATION 
INCIDENTS 
The following guidelines and recommendations are only given to suggest further 
research.  As well, these recommendations will facilitate dissemination of information 
and development of capability in the medical community in response to a radiation 
incident of either an accidental nature or one of an intentional terrorist act utilizing a 
radioactive component.  In the aftermath of a large radiation incident in the Sacramento 
region, it is unlikely that emergency response personnel would maintain control of all 
victims of the incident.  As seen in past mass casualty incidents involving acts of 
terrorism,  including the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the sarin attack in Tokyo, 
Japan, the majority of patients that are seen at medical facilities in the immediate 
aftermath of such incidents are self transported.48  Medical facilities in the area, including 
hospitals, private medical offices or local clinics, will be impacted by self-initiated or 
privately transported victims.   
The fear and misunderstanding of radiation in the general public also applies to 
health care professionals, necessitating awareness and training curriculum in addition to 
policies and procedures.  Yet the instances of radiation incidents are very low, leading 
policy makers to potentially question the allocation of resources to prepare for such a low 
probability event.   
According to the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site 
(REAC/TS), only 428 major radiation accidents have been recorded between the years 
1944 and 2005, resulting in 126 radiation-related deaths.49  With such a low prevalence 
of emergencies resulting from radiation incidents, current policies addressing hazardous 
materials in general have been considered adequate in dealing with radiation 
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emergencies.  The potential threat of terrorist groups utilizing radioactive or nuclear 
weapons has prompted the emergency response and medical care providers to reassess 
their radiation response plans and procedures to address adequately radiation 
injury/contamination issues.50 
The coordination and preplanning between first responders, transportation 
providers and hospitals prior to a response to a large scale radiation event will be 
necessary to facilitate accurate and timely patient triage, transport and subsequent 
treatment at the appropriate treatment facility. 
A thorough understanding of radiation hazards and cooperation between the 
regional hospitals will be necessary to initiate patient transportation plans properly, and 
to distribute appropriately critical patients to regional emergency departments.  The 
current ability of a hospital to treat contaminated patients, and provide for safety of their 
personnel, may vary by regional hospital.  “Larger hospitals may have an active nuclear 
medicine department with a staff that is familiar with radiation matters, while a small 
medicine treatment facility may not have such a benefit.  Planning and preparedness 
training/drills are recommended.”51 
The University of California, Davis Medical Center, has established radiation 
treatment policies in place to treat appropriately immediate patients despite being 
contaminated with radioactive material.52  Additionally, Mercy San Juan Hospital has 
addressed radiation preparedness in their Hospital Emergency Management Plan.  
“Radiation contamination of the types expected at our facilities is almost never 
immediately life threatening.  Treatment of serious medical problems, therefore, has 
priority over decontamination.  Where feasible, decontamination may be performed 
simultaneously with medical treatment.”53  A radiation protocol adopted by all area 
hospitals for care and treatment of contaminated radiation patients is needed to prevent 
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confusion and delay of advanced treatment of immediate patients.  Bill Potter from the 
State of California, Office of Emergency Services, Radiological Coordinator, stated 
during an interview, that throughout the State of California, identification of pre-
identified cleanup procedures, and recovery methods will decrease the likelihood of 
hospital facilities and private ambulance companies declining participation in treatment 
of contaminated patients during a mass casualty radiological event.54  In the author’s 
opinion, the transition of patients from the emergency scene to treatment facilities, in an 
expedient and organized manner, will likely result in the saving of more lives, and will 
require that the healthcare facilities and private transport providers are in collaboration 
with public emergency responders.  
B. RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES 
The intent of this section is to recommend that all area medical facilities have 
training and equipment to adequately treat radiological contaminated patients. The 
specific radiation response procedures for emergency department personnel will not vary 
widely from those described previously for first responders.   
Personnel must keep their exposure levels to radiation as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) by utilizing time, distance and shielding techniques to minimize 
exposure.  Additionally, protective clothing ensembles, detection/dosimeter equipment 
and tracking of exposures will be the same requirements as for first responders.  
Additionally, strict adherence to individual facility protocols to limit the spread of 
radiological contamination will allow for continuity of operations in the other areas of the 
facility. 
Once the incident is determined to be a mass casualty event, specific 
communication between the transportation unit leader and the disaster control facility 
(U.C. Davis) must take place.  The allocation of contaminated, critical patients to area 
trauma centers, utilizing transportation resources that are deemed “dirty” will reduce the 
potential spread of contamination to only a select number of facilities. As noted 
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previously, the emergency responders will only be handling a minority of patients, the 
remaining balance will self-dispatch to medical facilities. 
C. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR HOSPITAL PERSONNEL 
Universal precautions can be described as a practice in medicine of avoiding 
contact with blood-borne pathogens, either from bodily fluids or airborne particulate.  
Protective ensembles may include at a minimum, protective gowns, gloves, and eye 
protection.55  These precautions are appropriate for the treatment of contaminated 
radiological patients.  Additionally, a N95 facemask is adequate respiratory protection for 
radiological particulate.56  Individual dosimeters are advised, and accurate personnel 
exposure tracking with exit radiation surveys being conducted for personnel leaving the 
exclusion zone (hot zone), or the contamination reduction. (warm zone).57  
D. PATIENT ASSESSMENT IN THE HOSPITAL SETTING 
The stabilization of medical conditions that are immediately life threatening is the 
primary consideration, prior to addressing radiation contamination concerns.  It should be 
noted this is only applicable to radiation.  The possibility of patients having both 
radiological contaminations in combination with either chemical or biological 
contamination should be considered.  “In situations involving other types of hazardous 
material, such as chemicals, decontamination of the victims typically occurs prior to 
transport to the emergency department.”58  A majority of patients might self-report to the 
emergency department, so hospital decontamination efforts must include 
decontamination procedures for delayed or minor radiological contaminated patients, or 
decontamination from chemical or biological agents.   
Medical procedures should be ruled out if a person presents with above 
background radiation reading during a radiation survey.  Recent nuclear medicine or 
oncology procedures may be the source of the radiation.59  
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“Hospitals with Nuclear Medicine or Radiation Oncology departments have 
radiation monitoring instruments.”60  Additionally, the Sacramento region has acquired 
radiation detection equipment along with decontamination equipment and training via the 
Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA) grants, so the resources required to 
manage a radiological event are available in the regional hospitals.  The allocation of 
these resources may not be available to satellite clinics or physician offices.  Therefore a 
coordinated medical plan will be necessary to develop a treatment procedure to 
incorporate potential large numbers of victims presenting at local health facilities. 
“An exceptionally important triage strategy is that of establishing a secondary 
assessment center physically separate from the hospital.  This is a basic step towards 
protecting the hospitals from being overwhelmed.  It is also useful for pre-clinical 
screening, assessing exposure and contamination, and conducting triage and 
decontamination as well as reuniting families.”61  The staffing of these centers will be a 
challenge to any municipality.  For example, in Goiania, Brazil, approximately 112,000 
people were assessed at a local soccer stadium to screen for radiation contamination and 
associated injuries.  The number of personnel to accomplish this screening operation was 
substantial.  The pursuit of a specialized citizen emergency response team (CERT), which 
would be composed of trained professionals from radiological fields in the region, might 
be a useful solution to staff these centers during the initial period following a large 
radiation incident.  The “Radiological CERT” team members might be drawn from 
private industry, power companies, universities or medical institutions from localities that 
are not directly impacted by the emergency.  A civilian radiation expert would be an 
effective force multiplier to emergency response, or emergency department personnel and 
assist in the facilitation of screening of large volumes of “concerned” patients that are not 
necessarily contaminated.  Additionally, these “Radiological CERT” members would be 
able to supervise lay personnel/volunteers providing such services as 
collection/distribution of contaminated clothing, and distribution of educational material. 
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Psychological counseling will be an important aspect to minimize the fear aspect of the 
incident as well.  Medical plans should incorporate a psychological response at the 
secondary assessment sites as well.  
E. HOSPITAL DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES 
Each medical facility has a unique layout and internal policies to reduce the 
spread of contamination within their respective facilities.  The author recommends the 
regional hospitals develop a common standard of practice based on recognized protocols 
which address radiation decontamination for hospitals.  In the interim, all radiological 
cleanup operations should be facilitated at the direction of the radiological safety officer, 
per individual hospital policy and procedure.  
Portal radiation monitors are often used in medical facilities to survey trash.62 
Portal monitors are useful and will potentially save vast amounts of time to quickly scan 
material to insure that contamination does not exceed two times the background, which is 
the EPA standard for radiological contamination.  Additionally, portal monitors may be 
adapted to be used to quickly survey patients, at a central point of entry, to enhance the 
speed of radiological screening of patients.   
Generally, radiation contamination clean up can be facilitated by normal cleaning 
methods.63  
F. MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES 
The primary goal for emergency response and medical personnel is to utilize the 
aforementioned procedures to avoid becoming contaminated during the response to 
radiation emergencies.  However, should internal contamination occur, it is important for 
the response community to understand the medical interventions/medications that are 
available for subsequent treatment.  Knowledge of available medical interventions may 
assist in reducing the fear associated with radiation response.  Additionally, policy 
makers must understand the availability of these medications and how to request them if 
needed.   
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Medications that are designed to prevent radiation damage to human tissues are 
called radioprotectants.64  Radioprotectants are intended for pre-exposure use and have 
very little application after an exposure has taken place.65  These pharmaceuticals are 
generally used for pre-cancer therapy so that the invasive radiation therapy does not 
injure healthy tissue. 
Other pharmaceuticals treat post-exposure contaminates by blocking the absorbed 
dose, such as potassium iodide, or enhances the excretion of contaminates by blocking 
the absorption of the material in the intestines.  These are called decorporation agents and 
are generally given to internally contaminated victims for a specific isotope exposure.66  
1. Prussian Blue 
“On January 31, 2003, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) called on 
companies to create marketing plans for Prussian blue.  The FDA news release stated, 
‘After a review of cases in published literature, FDA determined that 500-mg Prussian 
blue capsules would be safe and effective for the treatment of patients with known or 
suspected internal contamination with radioactive thallium, non-radioactive thallium, or 
radioactive cesium.”67  Prussian blue is stockpiled in the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS), which is a collection of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies strategically located 
in various parts of the country for deployment in the aftermath of a WMD incident.68 
This drug should not be seen as a cure-all-end-all solution to internal radiation 
contamination due to it is not suitable for all radioactive substances.69  Medical 
professionals can prescribe Prussian blue for a person who is internally contaminated 
with cesium or thallium.  Prussian blue works by binding radioactive materials in the 
intestines,  stopping  the  absorption  of  the  material into the body.  The contamination is  
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excreted by the bowel, reducing the contamination in the body, and thus decreasing the 
time of radiation exposure to tissues.70  Side effects include constipation and upset 
stomach.71 
2. Diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (DTPA) 
DTPA is a calcium or zinc salt that is utilized to treat internally contaminated 
patients from isotopes such as plutonium, americium, californium, curium, and 
berkelium.72  “Both forms are capable of binding to certain radioactive materials and 
speeding up the release of these materials in the urine, thus reducing the amount of 
internal contamination.”73  DTPA is stored in the SNS.  DTPA can be administered 
intravenously or inhaled for lung contamination, but is available by prescription only. 
3. Potassium Iodide 
Potassium iodide (KI) is effective in reducing the concentration of radioiodine in 
the thyroid gland if administered shortly before or shortly after internal contamination 
with radioactive iodine.  Radioactive iodine is expected in the aftermath of a nuclear 
power accident.  Radioactive iodine is not expected in the aftermath of a RDD due to the 
absence of radioactive iodine in material that is probable in use as a “dirty bomb.” KI is 
available without a prescription and is readily available.  When taken at the direction of 
public health officials, the benefits of KI greatly outweigh the risks, which include 
intestinal upset, allergic reactions, rashes, or inflammation of the salivary glands.74   
Public health providers should anticipate a large demand for KI in the aftermath 
of a radiation incident, regardless of the efficacy of the treatment, due to the 
preconditioned expectation of the public as to its effectiveness.75  This issue can be 
addressed by an aggressive public education campaign to familiarize the general public 
with the efficacy of medical treatments for radiation exposure, prior to an actual incident. 
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VI. LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 
First responding agencies will need to interface with responding state and federal 
resources.  The state resources that will assist in response and recovery of a large 
radiological incident will include, but not be limited to, the California Department of 
Health Services, Radiological Health Branch, California National Guard Civil Support 
Teams, and assistance from the California Office of Emergency Services.  
The Radiological Health Branch of the California Department of Health has 
responsibility to investigate radiation incidents, and the surveillance of radioactive 
contamination in the environment.76  There are two California, National Guard, and Civil 
Support Teams (CST).  One team is based in northern California, the other in southern 
California.  The CST’s are composed of 22-member teams whose mission is to assist 
local authorities in the event of an attack involving a weapon of mass destruction.77 
The federal response would include the Department of Energy’s (DOE), National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).  NNSA’s response assets include Atmospheric 
Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), Accident Response Group (ARG), Federal 
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), Nuclear Emergency Support 
Team (NEST), Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), and the Radiation Emergency 
Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).  “The RAP is usually the first NNSA 
responder for assessing the emergency situation and deciding what further steps should 
be taken to minimize the hazards of a radiological emergency.  Specific areas of expertise 
include assessment, area monitoring, air sampling, exposure and contamination 
control.”78 
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The author recommends further interaction with the state and federal assets prior 
to an actual radiation emergency. An increased awareness of stakeholder agency 
capabilities along with dialog as to developed response plans and individual agency 
expectations will potentially promote a smooth transition of responsibility, and facilitate a 
better working relationship with each local, state or federal stakeholder agency.. 
A. LOCAL POLICY CHALLENGES 
The response plans that have been developed since the events of 9/11 have added 
to the complexity of resource allocation, areas of expertise and oversight responsibility in 
regards to radiation incidents of national significance.  The current California Terrorism 
Response Plan, which is an appendix to the State Emergency Plan, was last updated in 
February of 2001.  As the events of September 11, 2001, transformed the nation’s 
response plans and capabilities, such as the addition of the California National Guard, 
Civil Support Teams, development of the National Response Plan, Adoption of NIMS, it 
is the recommendation of the author that the nation’s local and state plans must be 
updated as well to remain relevant. 
In addition to the updating of response policies, the continuous, on-going training 
and exercise of these plans with local, state and federal agencies is paramount.  The 
emergency response community is undergoing vast changes in leadership as a 
consequence of retiring senior members.  Local, state and federal agency succession 
planning must incorporate continuous updating of institutional knowledge in regards to 
planning and responding to radiological incidents and incidents of national significance 
in general. 
B. PHASES OF RADIATION RESPONSE 
To understand the contribution of each response agency in context, it is essential 
to understand the timelines of the incident.  A radiation emergency can be described as 
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1. Early Phase 
The first phase is referred to as the “Early Phase” which is the emergency phase.  
This period starts at the onset of the emergency and can range in time from several hours 
up to several days.  During the early phase, the initial protective actions by public safety 
personnel, such as fire, law enforcement and EMS, will be taking appropriate actions 
such as isolating the scene, denying entry and identification of the nature of the incident.  
Additional actions including sheltering populations in place, potential evacuation, initial 
treatment, transportation and decontamination of victims, scene stabilization and public 
health protective actions will occur during the early stages of the incident measured in 
hours.  “The first people likely to respond to a radiation emergency are the same firemen, 
hazardous materials teams, emergency medical technicians and law enforcement 
personnel who respond to other emergencies.”80 
2. Intermediate Phase 
The intermediate phase will overlap with the early phase, but is usually assumed 
to begin once the initial control and protective action decisions have been made.  During 
this time, more technical information is gathered regarding field measurements of total 
exposure and specific characteristics of the radioactive materials involved.  The timeline 
for the intermediate phase is assumed to be weeks to months until the protective actions 
of the incident are concluded.  This phase will overlap with the final phase of the incident 
where initial considerations for recovery and cleanup actions are considered. 
3. Late Phase 
The late phase is the final phase of the radiation incident.  During this phase, 
actions to reduce the radiation levels in the environment to recover the affected area from 
the incident effects.  In this period, there is no longer an “emergency situation.”  The 
collaboration of community and regional leaders will be essential to the restoration of the 
site to encompass sound decisions in making cost-effective decisions.  As currently 
provided by EPA standards, twice the background radiation levels is considered 
“contamination.”  During the recovery stage of a radiation incident, it may become cost 
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prohibitive to clean up a large area to such an exact standard, requiring the input of 
community stakeholders to make choices based on sound scientific data.81  
C. AGENCIES HAVING JURISDICTION 
It is essential for policy makers in the Sacramento Region to remain familiar with 
the outside assistance that will become readily available in the event that a radiation 
incident exceeds the capabilities of the local resources.  As part of any protocol, a clear 
understanding of the responding agencies roles and responsibilities is necessary to 
understand how each agency will integrate with others, and thus identify who is 
ultimately responsible during each of the aforementioned response phases.  Knowledge of 
these assisting agencies prior to the incident will enhance coordination and proper 
utilization of these resources upon arrival.  Additionally, the inclusion of anticipated 
support agencies and timelines of response will be of assistance to local incident 
commanders and may assist in alleviating political “turf” battles which may arise if 
outside resources arrive without a thorough, pre-identified plan. 
Many of the assisting agencies will require hours if not days to arrive on scene.  
For this reason, it is paramount for local commanders to recognize the potential for 
escalation of radiological emergencies beyond the capabilities of local response and 
request outside resources in the early stages of the emergency.  Additionally, technical 
guidance and expertise can be gleaned from radiation response elements during their 
response. 
D. FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS 
“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for overall 
coordination of all actual and potential Incidents of National Significance, including 
terrorist incidents involving nuclear material.”82  This is done in accordance to 
Presidential Directive-5 and is described in the National Response Plan.  Federal 
response to any specific incident is based on the local agencies ability to respond, identify 
the amount of material involved, the extent of the impact to the environment, or 
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populations and the overall magnitude of the incident.83  Local responders must 
understand that Federal agencies may self-dispatch within their own statutory authority, 
to assess hazards associated with a radiological event with the intent of decreasing time 
lags of notification.84 
National Defense Area (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA) can be 
established by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), or National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to safeguard 
classified information.  The area involved will fall under Federal control for reasons of 
national security.85 
1. National Response Plan 
The National Response Plan (NRP) describes how federal agencies and 
departments will collaborate with each other and with local, state, tribal governments and 
the private sector during incidents.86  “It establishes protocols to help protect the nation 
from terrorist attacks and other natural and manmade hazards; save lives; protect public 
health, safety, property and the environment; and reduces adverse psychological 
consequences and disruptions to the American way of life.”87  All incidents are to be 
handled at the lowest level possible by the jurisdiction having authority.  “For those 
events that rise to the level of an Incident of National Significance, the Department of 
Homeland Security provides operational and/or resource coordination for Federal support 
to on-scene incident command structures.88 
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For purposes of this document, it is important to note The Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex of the NRP supersedes the former Federal Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan from 1996.89  
2. National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
“Provides a nationwide template enabling Federal, State, local and tribal 
governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together 
effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for respond to, and recovery from domestic 
incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”90  
E. STATE RESPONSE PLANS 
The State of California has a robust mutual aid system implemented/managed 
through the Office of Emergency Services, utilizing a regional system for assistance to 
areas where capacity to respond has been overwhelmed, requiring additional resources or 
expertise to handle a particular emergency.  The operational areas (OA) utilize all assets 
within their respective OA’s.  At such time the resources in the OA are not adequate to 
mitigate an emergency, a request to the Office of Emergency Services at the Regional 
Emergency Operational Center is made.  OES coordinates a systematic draw-down of 
resources from other OA’s within the state to facilitate the requests for resources.  
A state of emergency declaration by the Governor makes available all resources 
of the state and is outlined in the State Emergency Plan..91 
State resources that are available for a radiological emergency include: 
• Civil Support Teams (CST), (2), the 9th CST in southern California, and the 95th  
CST in northern California.  
• Air Resources Board-air quality within the state. 
• California Highway Patrol-Incident commander for HazMat, law enforcement 
mutual aid. 
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• Department of Fish and Game-lead agency for petroleum spills, HazMat. 
• Department of Food and Agriculture-Pesticides and fertilizer expertise. 
• Department of Forestry and Fire Protection-fire protection, arson and explosive 
ordinance disposal (EOD). 
• Department of Health Services-technical expertise, assistance and laboratory 
support for incidents involving the use or threatened use of CBRN agents 
• Department of Industrial Relations-evaluate and advise on health and safety plans 
during response to WMD/NBC incidents 
Additionally, states can send and receive aid to other states via the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).  All Fifty states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and the District of Columbia have ratified EMAC.92 ”EMAC is the primary legal 
tool that states use to immediately send and receive emergency personnel and equipment 
during a disaster.  Prior to adopting EMAC, the Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services (OES) negotiated governor-to-governor agreements with other states, often 
lengthening response time.”93   
Once state resources are overwhelmed, the Governor may request assistance from 
the Federal government either under the Presidential disaster or emergency declaration.94  
F. FEDERAL RESPONSE TO A RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT 
1. Coordinating Agencies vs. Cooperating Agencies 
Both cooperating agencies and coordinating agencies support DHS during an 
incident of national significance (INS).  Coordinating agencies have the primary 
responsibility for Federal activities during a radiological event.  The coordinating agency 
is the agency having oversight for the specific material or circumstances involved.  
Cooperating agencies assist as necessary with support functions, but are subordinate to 
the coordinating agency, lending support and technical assistance.  
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The following is a brief overview of coordinating areas of responsibility per the 
National/Radiological Incident Annex:95 
• Terrorism- DOD or DOE if occurrence happens on their facility or 
material under their control; NRC if material is licensed by the NRC or a 
contract with the state. 
• For all other terrorism, DOE is the coordinating agency. 
• Nuclear Facilities-DOE or DOD if it is their facility; NRC if licensed or 
agreement with state; unlicensed or not owned by a federal agency, the 
EPA becomes the coordinating agency. 
• Transportation-DOD or DOE for their material; NRC for their material; 
DHS/USCG for materials in coastal zones for materials not licensed or 
owned by a Federal agency; all others are under the coordination of the 
EPA 
• Space Vehicles-NASA or DOD; DHS/USCG if not managed by DOD or 
NASA; all others, are the responsibility of the EPA 
• Weapon accident- depending on custody at the time of incident is either 
the DOD or DOE. 
2. U.S. Department of Defense 
The DOD has the primary mission of homeland defense and the second priority of 
supporting civil authorities in recovering from multiple, catastrophic WMD attacks at 
home.96  “With few exceptions, DOD’s consequence management capabilities are 
designated for the wartime protection of the Department’s personnel and facilities.  
Nevertheless, civil authorities are likely to call upon these capabilities if a domestic 
CBRNE catastrophe occurs in the ten-year period of this Strategy.”97 
The DOD began implementing National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) in 
1998 under the Clinton Administration.  The CST’s were established to deploy rapidly to 
assist local incident commanders.  The CST’s mission is to assist in determining the 
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nature and extent of an attack provide technical knowledge and assistance to on scene 
commanders.98  “They are a key element of the DoD’s overall program to provide to civil 
authorities in the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction in the 
United States.99  The CST provides a WMD response platform that is able to bridge the 
gap between state and Federal authorities.  The teams are federally funded and equipped, 
being ultimately under federal doctrine, but are located in the command structure under 
the state adjutant generals.100  Once a governor asks for federal assistance, the same CST 
will assist in coordinating additional military support and other federal assets to support 
local commanders.  
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VII. RECOVERY STAGE 
The Health Physics Society believes that is unlikely that a radiological terrorist 
attack (not including a nuclear weapon) will disperse enough radioactive material 
sufficiently to contaminate the air or ground to harm the public or emergency response 
workers.101 
“The Health Physics Society believes that the protective actions and protective 
action guides following a radiological event should be consistent with the existing federal 
guidance for nuclear incidents, with appropriate accommodation of unique aspects of a 
terrorist event.” 102   
A. INFRASTRUCTURE DECONTAMINATION, CLEANUP, 
REMEDIATION 
“In contrast to existing regulations governing the release of radiation at a nuclear 
facility or industrial waste site, the guidelines for a radiological dispersal devise (RDD) 
cleanup must anticipate the high likelihood that such an attack would occur in a heavily 
populated area, where the extensiveness of the decontamination effort will have to be 
balanced with a community’s need to access the affected zone.”103  Guidelines will also 
face the challenge of minimizing the disruptive impact of a dirty bomb attack in the face 
of intense public fear about exposure to even extremely low levels of radiation.104  For 
this reason, it is paramount to include local official into the planning phase regarding 
recovery of the affected site to insure community approval and “buy in” supports the final 
decision process in terms of re-occupying or abandoning the site.  An additional 
challenge will be to overcome the fear of the public regarding exposure and associated 
health effects caused from relatively low levels of radiation.  As of this writing, there is 
no clear guidance on acceptable levels of public exposure levels relative to a RDD attack 
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regarding the late phase of the incident.105 This statement is substantiated by the Health 
Physics Society which states, “The PAG Manual does not have any protective actions or 
PAG’s for the late (recovery) phase.”106  
Anti-nuclear activist groups contend that long-term guidance for acceptable 
radiation expose guidelines that do not meet the EPA Superfund Levels will significantly 
weaken requirements, thereby weakening the decontamination and public health 
efforts.107  
The EPA’s non-binding recommendation for exposure to radiation is based upon 
accidental release primarily from power plants.  For this reason, the aforementioned dose 
rates have not been affirmed to being applicable to an intentional terrorist attack.  The 
Department of Homeland Security may utilize the Environmental Protections Agencies 
guidelines from 1992 in the PAG, for the immediate and intermediate stages of an 
intentional act.108 
B. RECOVERY (LATE) PHASE 
During the recovery phase of a radiological incident, dose rates will become a 
potential source of controversy and debate based on the lack of definitive standards or 
recommendations as to the radiation dose rates.  The concept of ALARA (As low as 
reasonably achievable) will be the basis by which the dose rates will be determined in the 
late phase.  These recommended dose levels will take into consideration both economic 
and social factors. 
The fundamental difference between an intentional radiation attack (e.g., dirty 
bomb) versus an industrial accident at a nuclear power plant or transportation emergency 
would be one of geography.  An intentional act will be focused on population centers and 
areas of economic importance.  “If no one wants to go back to work in downtown 
Manhattan, then we’re in trouble,” says James L. Conca, director of the Carlsbad 
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Environmental Monitoring and Research Center at New Mexico State University.109  
Decontamination techniques currently available, such as sandblasting and demolition are 
not feasible options to decontaminating areas such as Manhattan or symbolic icons such 
as the Smithsonian museums, Library of Congress, or the U.S. Capital buildings.  
Additionally, the enormous length of time that it would require to decontaminate vast 
urban areas would make this process inapplicable.  In various dirty bomb scenarios 
described by the Federation of American Scientists, an amount of cesium-137 equivalent 
to that found in medical gauges is detonated with 10 pounds of TNT to disperse the 
radioactive material into populated areas.  In the simulations, the FAS determines from 
modeling data that in the first five blocks, the risk of getting cancer, above normal levels 
prevalent in a population ordinarily, will be one more death per each thousand people 
exposed.  This number would equate to 150 mR/year exposure, assuming that individuals 
would inhale, ingest and be externally exposed to the material.110  
The EPA decontamination rule of thumb for the cleanup up efforts following a 
radiation incident is to remediate the site to contamination levels not to exceed the risk of 
cancer in humans to one person in ten thousand.111   This level corresponds to a radiation 
dose of approximately 15 mR/yr dose (accumulated exposure).  In the above mentioned 
scenario, a strip of approximately 40 blocks in an urban area would be contaminated to 
this level.  Some materials that would be used in a RDD may bind with building materials 
or become lodged in cracks and crevasses creating significant decontamination issues.112  
In March of 2002, Dr. Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American 
Scientists testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stated that 
radiation is a credible threat, and that the contamination would be higher than the EPA 
health and toxic material guidelines.  He further states that there are no effective ways to 
                                                 
109 Peter Weiss, "Ghost Town Busters: After a dirty-bomb attack, special formulations could counter 
radioactive contamination," Science News Online 168, no. 18 (October, 29 2005): 1. 
http;//www.sciencenews.org/scripts/printthis.asp?clip=%2Farticles%2F20051029%2Fclip%/ [Accessed 
May 5, 2006]. 
110 Eraker, "Cleanup after a Radiological Attack," 169. 
111 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President, Federation of 
American Scientists, www.fas.org/ssp/doc/kelly_testimony_030602.pdf. [Accessed May 3, 2006]. 
112 Ibid. 
 48
decontaminate buildings that exceed these levels whereby demolition may be the only 
practical solution.  “If such an event were to take place in a city like New York, it would 
result in losses of potentially trillions of dollars.”113 
The technology in the radiation cleanup is developing rapidly to include 
technologies in radiation-binding and radiation-ridding gels, foam products, films and 
emulsions.  The goal of radiation decontamination is to be sensitive to the environmental 
concerns, health aspects, but to be accomplished with speed and at a price that does not 
become prohibitive.114  Specific information pertaining to technical information 
regarding emerging technologies is closely guarded both from an operational security 
standpoint and from an industrial patent stance.  “We don’t want to expose a 
vulnerability, “explains biologist Thomas P. McCreery of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency.115  
Policy makers may need to consider alternative avenues or non-traditional 
procedures to facilitate decontamination procedures in the aftermath of a radiological 
incident.  For example, a company called Isotron has developed a material that provides a 
polymer coating that can be inserted into firefighting hose streams that would dry in a 
short time to form a tacky polymer sheet.  This material would be able to trap radioactive 
contamination to reduce the spread and associated radioactive dust hazards.  The pre-
planning and collaboration of stakeholder agencies would be necessary to facilitate such 
an operation.  Other options may include a thorough deluge of water to wash 
contaminates into a contained water storage area such as the storm water system.116  
“Alternatively, the wash water could be treated at the outflow points using inexpensive 
materials such as gabions or zeolitic gravel ($80/ton) which is extremely specific for 
cesium and other radionuclides.”117 These strategies would remain highly controversial, 
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but prior knowledge of the “possibilities” may lead to collaboration rather than friction 
between stakeholders, leading to imaginative solutions in critical situations. 
A comprehensive response to a radiation emergency, especially a dirty bomb 
scenario, is essential for the safety of the general public and that of the emergency service 
providers.  Secondarily, the protection of the environment is of extreme importance.  
Perhaps equal to these significant response issues is the importance of efficient mitigation 
of the catastrophic effects of the attack.  “Ultimately, however, there may be no measure 
more critical to preventing dirty-bomb attacks than cleaning up quickly after the very first 
one.  Should an attack take place, says Conca, its perpetrators will probably be 
monitoring the speed and efficacy of the cleanup to decide the value of launching another 
attack.”118  “The number of dirty bombs we face,” he predicts, “will be determined by 
how we deal with the first.”119  
C. PROJECTED DOSE 
The method to calculate a dose for a given exposed population of civilians or 
emergency responders is an essential issue that must be addressed in pre-emergency 
planning and should reflect the PAG’s.  Additionally, it is important for policy makers 
and field commanders to understand that projected doses do not actually equate to actual 
doses to real individuals.  Projected doses are utilized to develop a framework to enhance 
the decision processes during the incident.120  At this time, there is no method for 
calculating projected dose rates for the late phase121.  It is the recommendation of the 
Health Physics Society that “…methods for calculating projected doses for comparison to 
the early and intermediate phase protection action guides should be consistent with those 
currently existing in the PAG Manual, but should be based on the latest available dose 
conversion factors.  The Health Physics Society recommends that the PAG’s should 
utilize projected dose computer programs or methods that are already in use by federal 
radiological agencies which use realist scenarios for the actual use of areas in question.122  
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The EPA has set an upper limit of acceptable radiation levels following a 
radiation cleanup operation to be 15 mR a year above the average individual background 
dose for a lifetime (40 years) 123  As mentioned previously, 360 mR average individual 
background results from exposure to natural occurring radiation levels caused by the 
natural and human-made sources.124  
“In contrast to the EPA, the NRC has consistently enforced a standard of 25 mR 
per year above background radiation levels for all sources of exposure, and generally 
considers this risk from excess radiation to be acceptable for the general public.”125  The 
ramifications of federal agencies having differing views of acceptable radiation standards 
may result in lack of public trust and confidence in government decision processes, or 
may delay responders from initiating effective actions during the three phases of the 
incident (early, intermediate or late phases).126 The recommendation of the author is for 
the CDC or other recognized medical authority to make a determination as to what the 
acceptable risk is so that both the public and responders will have confidence in the dose 
recommendations prior to an actual incident. 
D. VICTIM DECONTAMINATION/POPULATION MONITORING 
External monitoring and decontamination efforts for victims are the responsibility 
of local, state and tribal governments with the assistance of federal resources if so 
requested.127   The Emergency Support Function #8 stipulates that the Health and Human 
Services (HHS) assists and coordinates the monitoring and external decontamination with 
the local and state officials.128  Additionally, the HHS supports the state agencies in 
monitoring for internal radiation contamination as well as assisting in the deployment of 
pharmaceuticals which are requested by state health officials.129  The Health and Human 
Services also assists in the long-term monitoring of victims in order to evaluate the 
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adverse health effects impacts and will assist in performing dose reconstruction estimates 
and developing a registry of contaminated patients.130  
E. RECOVERY ACCORDING TO THE NUCLEAR ANNEX OF THE NRP 
The coordinating agency for incidents of national significance is the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  DHS facilitates the federal activities required 
to cleanup an incident utilizing the NRP.131  
The term “recovery” can be defined as any action dedicated to the continued 
protection of the public and resumption of normal activities in the affected area.132  The 
planning phase of the recovery effort is initiated by the state, local or tribal governments 
and does not usually take place until the initial stabilization of the scene occurs. 
The total impact of released radiation will be dependent on variables such as 
weather conditions, amount and type of radionuclide used, time of exposure and the 
method in which the radiation is distributed.133  
F. LONG-TERM HEALTH EFFECTS 
“The Environmental Protection Agency supports the approach that radiation 
related health effects can be extrapolated by radiation exposure and is linearly dependent 
on the intensity of the radiation and exposure to any amount of radiation causes increased 
health risks, such as increased probability of developing cancer.”134  An alternative point 
of view is that there is a minimum threshold of radiation, under which there is no adverse 
health effects.  Supporters of this threshold theory state that regulatory actions for 
radiation exposures below this level are unnecessary, where as supporters of the linear 
model feel that in the absence of credible proof, a more cautious model is appropriate.135  
In the aftermath of a large-scale radiation incident, local, state and federal officials will 
determine the acceptable limits of exposure to reoccupy an area which exceeds the 
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current radiation exposure limits.  Clearly, the acceptable tolerance levels may need to be 
adjusted on a case-by-case basis following a radiation incident to address reasonable 
health consequences balanced with economic consequences. 
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VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIOLOGICAL 
EMERGENCIES 
A. RADIATION AS A WEAPON OF FEAR 
1. Maximizing the Impact of an Act of Terror 
Radiation is a perfect weapon for a terrorist organization to maximize their impact 
in an act of terror.  “Even more than the events of the fall of 2001, an attack using nuclear 
materials, whether in a nuclear weapon, from a nuclear power plant, or from a radioactive 
source, would cause a residual fear in the population about their safety and the safety of 
their environment due to possible physical contamination, their own exposure to 
radiation, and the long-term effects of radioactive fallout.”136 The opportunity  to kill 
large numbers of Americans, destabilizing public confidence in its leadership, and 
potentially instilling huge economic devastation, all while exploiting an instilled 
“irrational fear” of radiation of the American population makes utilization of radiation 
desirable to terror groups.137   
2. Characteristics of Radiation Which Accentuate the Fear 
Radiation is an effective method to instill terror in a population for several 
reasons.  Since the development and use of the atomic bomb during World War II, 
followed immediately by the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation, the 
American public has feared radiation.  Additionally, Americans have a pre-conditioned 
fear of radiation based on an emotional perception and the advertised negative 
consequences due to radiation exposure, such as cancer, birth defects and the anticipated 
catastrophic outcomes of a radiological accident or attack.  The invisible nature of 
radiation, undetectable without technical equipment, adds to the hysteria.  The terms 
“nuclear,” “radioactive,” and “deadly,” all contribute instilling an initial feeling of fear 
regarding radioactive materials.  This fear can develop to a phobia which cause 
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individuals to make decisions according to perceived fears of consequences based on 
“What if?” rather than “What is.”138 
3. Case History, Goiania, Federative Republic of Brazil 
“Because of the extreme fears of radiation, it is anticipated that the number of 
citizens requesting surveys for radiological exposure will be several times greater than 
the number actually exposed.”139  This proved to be a gross underestimate in Goiania, 
Brazil, in 1987, following an accidental release of Cesium-137.  The Brazilian officials 
used the Olympic soccer stadium in the city to screen approximately 112,800 people for 
radiation.140  Of the 112,800 that were screened, 244 were found to be contaminated and 
54 were hospitalized, and only five died.141 The actual number of individuals 
contaminated or injured by the radiation exposure was exponentially less that those that 
were “worried.”  In addition to the 112,800 people screened for radiation, over eight 
thousand people requested radiation monitoring so that they might obtain a certificate of 
“clean.” This was necessary due to transportation and hotels refusing to serve individuals 
from this region of Brazil for fear of radiation contamination.142  Additionally, the 
economic impact to the region was significant.  A 20 percent reduction in agricultural 
exports, a decrease in the gross domestic product of 15 percent and a reduction in tourism 
to almost zero, was a consequence of this accident.143  
4. Emergency Response Personnel 
Fear of radiation is not specific to only civilian populations, but emergency 
responders as well. To operate effectively in a radiation incident, emergency responders 
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must not only be properly equipped with protective ensembles and detection devices, but 
prepared mentally to understand and address the hazards of radiation.   
• What questions must be asked to reduce fear and increase response to 
radiation emergencies either accidental or acts of terrorism for first 
responders? 
• What is the nature of radiation- alpha, beta, gamma, neutron or a 
combination? 
• How is the suspected material packaged? 
• With the package in place what are the hazards associated with each type 
of radiation? 
• If the material is outside the container, what are the associated risks? 
• What are the exposure risks based on time, distance and shielding under 
the current conditions? 
• What are the routes of exposure for personnel working in a radioactive 
environment, and what are the protective clothing/barrier options to ensure 
worker safety? 
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
The importance of recognizing the need to consider the psychological effects of 
terrorism on the general population, and that of emergency responders, is the first step in 
establishing an effective strategy for counter-terrorism.  With respect to terrorism in 
general, and radiological terrorism specifically, it is important to recognize the 
psychological effects to the population will be significant, regardless of any adverse 
health effects which may result.144 Just the mere threat of a radiological event will have a 
demonstrable impact on the psyche of the general population.145 
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“Federal efforts in developing medical RDD [radiation dispersal device] 
countermeasures might serve to reduce the psychological aspects of an RDD attack.  
Validated medical countermeasures might reduce public panic and concern about the 
exposure of first responders to radiation during treatment of casualties.  Alternatively, a 
similar reduction in the psychological impact of an RDD attack might be achieved 
through continuing public outreach campaigns.”146 Additionally, compliance to a strict 
standard for exposure limits may actually reduce anxieties of the general public due to the 
skepticism of the credibility of the threshold limit theory mentioned previously.  A draft 
guideline published by the Department of Homeland Security has been characterized as 
too lenient when assessing long term exposure limits in the aftermath of an RDD 
attack.147 
“It is imperative that the public be psychologically immunized against the 
radiological attack threat, through an extensive public education campaign that leads 
citizens to understand (1) that such attacks rarely pose immediate threats to life, (2) that 
the decision to shelter or flee will depend on the circumstances of the event and that 
minimizing risk to personal health will depend on rapidly receiving and adhering to 
guidance from government authorities, and (3) that proper treatment can greatly reduce 
long-term health effects in many cases.”148 
1. Recommendations for Preparation 
“Preparatory measures can include education efforts to immunize the public 
psychologically against panic in the face of an RDD attack, which is unlikely to cause 
mass casualties; investment in development of technologies for wide-area 
decontamination; training for first responders and governmental authorities; advanced 
stockpiling of emergency response equipment and therapeutics.”149 
a. Training 
Radiation training must be available for the general public; public 
officials; emergency response, hospital, and other support personnel.  This training must 
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focus both on the threats from various types of radiation incidents and the treatment, 
transport, and the evacuation of the injured and/or threatened public or emergency 
responders.   
The development of decontamination and radiation exposure standards, 
which take into consideration both the economic consequences of a radiation incident and 
the health risks of exposed populations, must be addressed.  This will be exceedingly 
important to have in place prior to a radiation incident so that the perceptions of 
government standards by the public are based on scientific principles, not on expediency 
in the wake of a terrorist attack.150  
b. Role of Media 
Terror groups utilize the media to maximize the desired harm of the terror 
acts, making the attacks personalized to individual citizens, who may be located 
thousands of miles from the actual incident.  “It is possible that media overreaction could 
make even a low-level or failed nuclear incident a success in terms of creating fear in the 
public, causing high-impact economic disruption, and bringing broad attention to the 
cause of the terrorists.”151  Even a failed attempt at a high yield detonation, resulting in a 
low yield radiation release, could cause a great deal of fear or economic hardship. 
In the aftermath of a radiological incident, the role of the media will play 
an essential role in the confidence of the public in the ability of community leaders and 
the government to respond to the incident.  The media must seek factual information 
from credible sources such as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. 
Surgeon General, public health officials and other agencies having responsibility for 
response to the incident.152  “Newspaper editors, columnists, radio talk show personalities 
and television reporters who are known and respected will be followed carefully.  These 
individuals should reinforce the messages delivered by the anonymous names and faces 
of government agencies.”153 
                                                 
150  Ferguson, Four Faces, 331. 
151  Ibid., 43. 
152 Hugh W. Wyatt, “The Role and Responsibility of the Media in the Event of a Bioterrorist Attack.” 
Journal of Public Health Management and Practice, 6, no.4 (July 2000): 64. 
153  Ibid. 
 58
The media can assist public officials following a radiological attack in the 
following ways: by responsible and accurate reporting; facilitating a “heightened 
vigilance” of the community; provide a forum for informed discussion; and by insuring 
accountability of government agencies.154 
Pre-planning with the media is important to establish trust and 
partnerships.  These relationships and partnerships should include media participation in 
fear management programs developed prior to an incident.155  The medias expertise will 
ensure the proper mediums and appropriate themes are utilized to maximize public 
exposure to accurate information.156  “Allowing the media some ‘ownership’ of the 
program will produce a more effective incident response and management tool.”157  
c. Public Education 
Terrorism experts say the “blunting” of the psychological impact of a 
terrorist attack must begin before an actual incident.158  Stephen Flynn, a security analyst 
at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes that a sustained public education campaign 
is what is needed to decrease the fear of the public regarding terrorism.  “'Fear of 
terrorism,' Flynn said, 'is directly related to a level of ignorance and a sense of 
hopelessness and inability to control events.'  Education is the antidote.”159 
Dr. Boaz Ganor states, “Public education contributes to solutions by 
reducing the fear and paralysis that terrorism can cause.  Furthermore, public 
information, particularly in a liberal democracy, reinforces trust and disarms terrorists, 
who seek to undermine society’s stability.”160   
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Unintended or willful errors by the media add to the “terror” of terrorism.  
A successful public awareness and education campaign must focus on the proper 
dissemination of facts and allow the community to integrate those facts into their own 
collective consciousness.  These facts may need to be utilized in analogies so that the 
general public may come to appreciate the science by correlating the information to 
something within their experience or knowledge.  For example, the media might describe 
the half-life of radiation source in comparison to the amount of time it would take for a 
given quantity of water to evaporate. What is needed is more aggressive public 
information campaigns prior to an actual emergency through public broadcasts, posted 
information in public areas and through educational programs at all levels of the 
educational system. 
The public information and education issues related to nuclear/radiological 
terrorism include the perceptions of radiation by the public; an appreciation of their 
information needs so as to address adequately their perceptions which influence their 
factual understanding; concerns related to their personal and family safety; and an 
analysis of the proper media to present this information to different groups. 
The response from the general public will either greatly benefit the 
situation, or greatly hamper response efforts to a radiation emergency, depending on their 
reaction to the hazards or “fear” associated with the incident.  Public education strategies 
must focus on providing accurate, credible information which will decrease the likelihood 
of general panic or anxiety, but must be done before the incident.161  “At its best, this 
education can help to ‘psychologically immunize’ the public against a radiological attack, 
making citizens less likely to panic.”162  It should be noted that the general public may be 
skeptical of even credible information.163  
d. During the Event 
Accurate and expedient information as to shelter, evacuation instructions, 
and personal protection guidelines, need to be communicated through public broadcast 
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systems, or the emergency alert systems.164  Information needs to be communicated by 
trusted community or civic leaders who enjoy the general respect or confidence of the 
general public.  “Equally important to informing the public is teaching the news media, 
first responders and federal, state, and local officials about the effects of radiation, 
radioactive materials, and RDD's and how to communicate credibly and effectively with 
the public.”165  The U.S. National Academy of Sciences recommended in 2002 that “pre-
packaged” educational kits be distributed before an event and that the messages to be 
communicated to the public be pre-rehearsed and delivered by trained spokespersons, 
such as the Surgeon General, or someone that the public trusts.166 
C. ISRAELI EXPERIENCE WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF 
TERRORISM 
The State of Israel has been dealing with the day-to-day threats of terrorism since 
its creation in 1948.  Israel has found the need to develop a public education strategy to 
strengthen the resolve of the Israeli people with respect to the motivational aspects of 
terror attacks acts conducted by terrorist organizations.  “Terrorism has had a definite 
strategic effect, primarily because public morale eventually translates into shifts in 
political stance, which in turn effect changes in the nation’s policies.”167  “The greatest 
danger presented by terrorism is thus not necessarily the direct physical damage that it 
inflicts, but rather the injury to public morale and the impact on the way policy makers 
feel, think, and respond.”168 
A campaign to counter the psychological effects of terrorism with the intent of 
strengthening the public resolve and awareness was undertaken.  “Israeli terrorism 
experts from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) visit schools 
throughout the country and provide educational programs tailored to students of different 
age groups.  The intent of the ICT educational programs is to educate the civilian 
population as to the terrorist organizations motivations and to counter the psychological 
                                                 
164 Ferguson et al., Four Faces, 309. 
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166  Ibid. 
167 Ganor, “Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy,” 1. 
168  Ibid., 2. 
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effects of terrorism thereby decreasing the effectiveness of terrorism as a political tool 
creating a type of “vaccination” against terrorist organizations.169  These lectures describe 
the motives and operational strategy of terrorists, with the aim of immunizing students 
against the personalization of terror.”170 The ICT considers their Education Project to be a 
great success and has favorable reviews from the Israeli general public.171  
D. STRATEGIES TO IMPLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES TO 
MINIMIZE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF TERRORISM 
California has been effective in preparing for natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes, floods, and wildfire.  The frequency of these emergencies has necessitated 
Californians to become familiar with how to prepare and respond to these emergencies. 
These same proven strategies must be applied to address terrorism preparedness 
issues.  To date, neither California in particular, nor the United States in general, has 
done much to educate the general public as to the specific risks of radiological terrorism, 
nor the appropriate actions to take in case of an attack prior to an event.172  “Government 
officials must go beyond systems for informing the public to a robust effort to engage, 
inform, and educate the public about the nature of the terrorist threat and the policies and 
programs designed to improve the nation’s ability to respond to terrorism, and to help the 
public understand what it can do to prepare and protect itself.”173  Strategies to educate 
communities have been passive by nature, requiring individuals to seek out the 
information needed based on their own motivation. 
What is needed is more aggressive public information campaigns prior to an 
actual emergency through public broadcasts or paid advertisements in mass media, posted 
information in public areas such as bus stops, bill boards, phone books etc., and through 
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educational programs at all levels of the educational system similar to the other disaster 
preparedness programs presented to children in the school systems. 
Additional recommendations regarding the psychological aspects of a radiological 
incident are provided by the National Council Radiation Protection and Measurements 
which include.174  
• The building of public trust and the instilling of confidence through accurate 
information sharing with the media and through them to the general public.   
• Training at all levels including the policy makers. 
• Psychological aspects must be incorporated into all training exercises and 
emergency plans for long-term care of a segment of the population. 
Accurate information following an incident is important, but the credibility of that 
information will be more accepted by the general public if the guidelines and 
recommendations were clearly described prior to the incident.  The general population 
may be in a state of panic and fear, causing doubt as to the reliability of government 
information after the fact. 
                                                 
174  Hickey and Poston, “Overview,” 4. 
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IX. STRATEGIC PLAN:  RESPONSE TO RADIATION 
EMERGENCIES IN THE SACRAMENTO REGION 
A. FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF A REGIONAL RESPONSE 
PROTOCOL FOR RADIATION EMERGENCIES: 
The immediate and long-term ramifications of a coordinated and effective 
regional emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological accident or intentional 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack will equate to more lives saved and safer 
operations for responders in the aftermath of a radiation emergency.    
Radiological emergencies will task the Sacramento Region to reevaluate the 
current procedures to effectively treat critical patients in the aftermath of a radiation 
event.  Pre-planning and prior coordination of local, state and federal resources to 
mitigate the incident should be addressed in a radiation protocol.  The coordination of 
initial response through the recovery of affected infrastructure and population centers will 
ensure the effective use of resources, and enhance the efficiency of emergency 
operations.   
The response protocol will address the appropriate use of patient transport assets 
as well as the appropriate decontamination and recovery of those assets.  The exploration 
of appropriate preplanning and identification of required resources necessary to conduct 
the decontamination will reduce confusion and anxiety over loses of transport assets due 
to radiation contamination.  Additionally, the effective utilization of protective clothing 
ensembles and hasty patient packaging techniques to reduce the potential for radiation 
contamination of the first responders will be important considerations. 
As part of the radiation response plan, local, state and federal recovery resources 
will be pre-identified and, in concert with the associated training, will alleviate concern 
of cost recovery associated with contaminated transportation assets and fixed facilities.  
The clarification of recovery stage cost reimbursement, and decontamination procedures, 




B. ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN SUPPORTING THE STRATEGIC IDEA 
The current understanding of responding and treating victims of a radiation 
incident falls within the response protocols to generalized hazardous materials.  The 
Sacramento County Emergency Medical Service policy number 8029.05 states medical 
transportation units will only accept decontaminated patients from a HAZMAT team, and 
there are no provisions to transport contaminated patients. Unlike decontamination 
procedures required for generalized hazardous materials, the critically injured patients at 
a radiological event must be triaged for life threatening injuries prior to initiating time-
consuming decontamination processes to remove radiation contamination. The existing 
procedures for treating critically injured patients at a radiological event, as called for in 
the current policy, will make it extremely difficult to save the lives of the critically 
injured patient due to the current policies requiring decontamination of all contaminated 
patients prior to transportation to treatment facilities. 
C. ALTERNATIVE TO A STRATEGIC PLAN TO ADDRESS RADIATION 
RESPONSE IN THE SACRAMENTO REGION 
The Development of a strategic plan addressing radiation response in the 
Sacramento Region will be a dynamic process that will require initiation of new 
protocols, training and purchase of equipment.  To address this issue properly, the region 
must weigh alternative courses of action to ensure the radiation response issues have been 
fully addressed and to insure a “buy in” of stakeholders to the proposed course of actions. 
One could debate whether or not a specific radiation response protocol is 
necessary in the region, as the current hazardous material response teams are capable of 
responding to radiation emergencies.  The Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District, 
Roseville Fire District, and the Sacramento Fire Department hazardous materials 
response teams are equipped with radiation detection, and isotope identification 
equipment.  As seen in recent radiation emergencies, the current procedures for 
responding to radiation emergencies have not endangered the public nor emergency 
workers by being inadequate.  It could be argued that the system is functioning as 
designed.  From the years 2002-2005, the Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District has 
responded to four separate radiation-related emergencies, finding each of the instances to 
be well within the response capabilities of the responding units. It should be noted that 
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each of these emergencies did not require decontamination of personnel, nor were there 
any injuries to the public or emergency responders.   
The radiation responses that have been successfully mitigated have not included a 
human health or environmental impact as part of the response scenario; therefore it would 
be premature to conclude that current policies are adequate to address radiation incidents.  
Large scale radiological accidents or terrorist attacks utilizing radiological materials may 
tax municipalities with sound response protocols in place.  The size and scope of large-
scale radiation incidents will certainly overwhelm municipalities that have not 
implemented appropriate protocols, procedures, equipment and training needs to address 
radiation emergencies.  A regional response protocol to address the various aspects of 
radiation response to include allied stakeholder agencies in a comprehensive plan will 
reduce confusion, maximize resource allocation, response, and responder safety, but most 
importantly reduce the delay in transporting critically injured contaminated victims to 
medical care facilities, thereby potentially saving lives. 
D. NEW BUSINESS OR SET OF PROGRAMS NEEDED FOR THE 
RADIATION RESPONSE PROTOCOL TO BE IMPLEMENTED 
The response to radiation events will require the specific training and equipping 
of personnel to address this particular hazard.  A balanced approach insuring duality of 
purpose in response to both industrial or terrorism emergencies involving radiation is the 
solution.  The maximizing of existing resources at the local, state and federal levels 
combined with supplemental equipment that is affordable is essential.  Additionally, 
definitive protocols and proper training as to the psychological effects of the “fear” of 
terrorism will ensure the appropriate allocation of resources addressing the radiological 
risk. 
1. Equipment 
The Sacramento Region will need to deploy initial radiation detection equipment, 
including dosimeter equipment, to stakeholder response agencies to facilitate the initial 
alert to a radioactively contaminated environment.  This equipment will need to account 
for the long term dose monitoring of personnel working in the contaminated environment 




Training of regional stakeholders as to radiation protective equipment, radiation 
awareness training and specific regional policies related responding to radiation 
emergencies will be required.  Additionally, addressing the critical element of the “fear” 
of radiation will be a necessary part of a regional protocol to address radiation 
emergencies in general and radiological terrorism specifically.  A recognized national 
training program such as the Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation 
Training (MERRTT), which is facilitated through the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP), is needed to educate regional 
personnel as to national best practices  The utilization of recognized national training 
programs facilitated by lead federal agencies in radiation response will ensure 
consistency of information across response disciplines and assurance of technical 
accuracy of information to assist in stakeholder agency “buy-in.”  An emerging training 
curriculum that is developing for individual disciplines, such as the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) for hospital personnel, should be considered to maximize training 
resources that are already available thereby reducing effort needed facilitate training. 
3. Protocol 
Changes to address the specific hazards of radiation which facilitate the 
appropriate care and treatment of contaminated victims of a radiological incident will 
need to be developed to treat and transport patients appropriately.  A regional protocol 
that includes all stakeholder agencies will insure each agency is utilizing the same “play 
book” in the event of a radiation incident, reducing confusion, maximizing resource 
allocation and ultimately providing safer operations and more lives saved in the aftermath 
of a radiological incident. 
E. STRATEGIC PLAN INPUTS, OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES 
Radiation incidents may include terrorism threats, utilizing improvised nuclear 
devices; radiological dispersal devices; radiation proximity devices; nuclear attack; or 
accidental releases caused by industrial accidents in fixed facilities or transportation 
emergencies.  Large radiological incidents likely will exceed the capability of the local 
resources.  The local response will focus on isolating the area, identifying the hazards 
associated with the emergency, providing first aid and transporting the seriously injured 
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to local medical facilities and calling for state and federal resources to respond which do 
have the equipment, personnel and expertise to mitigate the incident. 
1. Inputs 
Future inputs will require training dollars for regional response personnel for 
initial radiation training, and to maintain currency of radiation response skills.  
Additionally, funding will be required to facilitate initial equipment purchases, 
replacement of damaged or lost equipment and continued assessment/procurement of 
advanced technological equipment that is emerging as innovations occur.  Additional 
expenses will occur in regards to staff hours towards committee work at various levels to 
develop, approve and implement a regional protocol. 
2. Outputs 
The outputs will include the production of qualified personnel, utilization of 
contemporary policies and radiation equipment.  A dual-purpose radiation response 
protocol will be adaptive to both responses to accidental radiation incidents as well as 
intentional terrorist attacks utilizing radiation. 
3. Outcomes 
The desired outcome of a regional radiation response protocol will ensure an 
effective response plan including, triage, treatment, decontamination, transportation of 
victims, and collaboration with regional, state and federal agencies in a fiscally 
responsible manner.  The improved treatment and transportation of immediate, 
contaminated patients will improve survival profiles of victims, and reduce the likelihood 
of agencies being held liable for failure to respond, protect emergency personnel, and 
treat victims in the aftermath of a radiation event to a level that meets recognized industry 
standards. 
F. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITY, AND CHALLENGES 
(SWOC) ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC ISSUE DEVELOPMENT 
The following is a SWOC analysis of the homeland security mission of the 






• Current fire department WMD capabilities 
• Regional cooperation and collaboration of stakeholder agencies 
• Local, state, federal and private industry response capabilities 
• Local responders being part of state and federal response mechanisms 
including the State Office of Emergency Services, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) assets, Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG, 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) region  
• Location of the Sacramento region relative to state and federal agencies, 
(Sacramento being the state capitol of, California, the 5th largest economy 
in the world.) 
• Strong statewide mutual aid plan based on a frequently utilized system to 
respond to floods, fires, earthquakes and civil unrest through the state 
office of emergency services. 
2. Weaknesses 
• Compartmentalized training within stakeholder agencies.  Homeland 
security mission and awareness is not widely distributed throughout 
agencies, but typically is focused in the special operations disciplines 
within each agency.  Often, senior management of stakeholder agencies is 
not as aware of plans or gaps in capabilities as are the leadership of special 
operations divisions.  
• Current policies do not address radioactively-contaminated patients as a 
separate group, as opposed to patients contaminated with other hazardous 
materials in terms of transportation relative to nature of injuries. 
• Current equipment of allied stakeholders, including some fire departments, 
does not facilitate early detection of radiation sources.  Only the California 
Highway Patrol has radiation detection capability, and only then in the 
commercial enforcement division and its special operations units.  Other 
law enforcement agencies including the Cities of Sacramento, Elk Grove, 
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Folsom, Roseville and Sacramento County Sheriff Department do not 
have radiation detection equipment short of the explosive ordinance 
disposal (EOD) teams. 
• Current training of front line personnel is inadequate to address radiation 
emergencies.  Only the regional fire departments regularly train for 
radiation emergencies based on having detection capability. 
• Lack of understanding of the “fear” components of WMD response and its 
ramification to the public as well as the responder community. 
3. Opportunities 
• The national WMD threat has facilitated a great deal of interaction 
between allied agencies that would not have otherwise occurred absent a 
WMD threat scenario.  This interaction has lead to increased 
communication and shared training which has proved beneficial in 
ordinary day-to-day emergencies.  As an example, the Law Enforcement 
EOD teams have a good working relationship with regional Hazardous 
Materials Response Teams.  The enhanced relationships have created 
dialog and operational improvements to disposal of potentially dangerous, 
explosive hazardous materials such as picric acid during routine 
emergencies. 
• The inclusion of stakeholder agencies that would not ordinarily be 
involved in regional policy development.  One such example is the newly-
formed “Consortium of Technical Responders” group which is tasked with 
development of regional strategies and policies to respond to technical 
emergencies, such as radiation emergencies, “white powder” incidents and 
pandemic flue.  The expertise from local, state, federal and private 
industry, including local universities with experts in various disciplines 
provides multiple view points in which strategies can be developed. 
• Federal funding to benefit the Sacramento Region directly for personnel 
staffing, equipment purchases and training reimbursement. 
 70
• Utilization of State and Federal expertise for specific WMD threats.  
Technical experts include members of the National Guard, Civil Support 
Teams, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, and Immigration, to only name a few. 
• Ability to initiate policies and procedures at the ground level to facilitate 
specific needs at a regional level. 
4. Challenges 
• Creating response plans to accommodate multiple disciplines. 
• Different shift schedules and training demands. 
• Large number of personnel to train/equip. 
• Disparate funding sources. 
• Potential loss of Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funding. 
• Interoperability of public agencies and “for profit,” private sector 
including area hospitals, and EMS providers. 
• Information sharing, both with external agencies as well as within 
agencies. 
• Dispelling the mind set of “It won’t happen here.” 
• Educating both the public and response community to mitigate the “fear” 
context of terrorism. 
• Maintaining organizational knowledge with a large transitional workforce 
in varying states of retirements and hiring practices. 
G. STRATEGIC ISSUES THAT BECOME APPARENT AFTER 
EVALUATION OF THE SWOC ANALYSIS INCLUDE 
• The consequences of both the public and responders “fear” regarding terrorism 
response must be addressed and accounted for in terrorism response planning and 
training. 
• Dissemination of information both within agencies and between agencies is 




radiation issues will strengthen institutional knowledge, and assist in addressing 
succession planning issues whereby individual knowledge or expertise is lost with 
separation of employment. 
• Capabilities of individuals, or individual disciplines, does not equate to regional 
capability unless the information/knowledge is shared and appreciated by all 
stakeholders. 
• Development of specific radiation protocols and subsequent training must address 
all stakeholders including private sector partners and be diverse to meet the 
differing work schedules of the regional partners. 
• The potential loss of funding from the UASI grant will necessitate the utilization 
of existing training infrastructure and mutual aid agreements to maximize the 
allocation of equipment and implementation of a radiation response protocol. 
H. BENCHMARKING 
Benchmarking the transportation policies for radioactively contaminated patients 
will be an important step in developing a strategic plan for a regional radiation response 
plan.  The Sacramento County Emergency Medical System protocols do not specifically 
address the transport of radiological contaminated patients, as opposed to contamination 
by hazardous materials in general.  Additionally, other municipalities in the region have 
not specifically addressed radiation contamination relative to patient transportation or 
other state entities including Santa Clara County whose policy #610 states, “All 
potentially contaminated patients must be properly decontaminated by the trained 
HAZMAT responders before emergency medical responders can administer treatment or 
transport the patients to an emergency medical facility.” 
International, national and state guidelines clearly indicate the need to transport 
patients that meet the “immediate” criterion based on medial triage. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency states, “In virtually all cases there will be little or no health risk 
to response personnel provided that, for response actions near any hazardous material, 
they follow the General part of the Personal Protection Guidelines.  There would not be a 
health hazard to medical staff treating or transporting of contaminated persons provided 
that they protect themselves against the inadvertent ingestion of radioactive material by 
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the use of normal barrier methods (use of surgical gloves and mask) and take actions to 
prevent the spread of contamination (e.g. to cover the patient in a blanket or sheet), 
remove and store outer clothing.”175 
National standards stated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Emergency 
Response Guidebook, as well as the California Specialized Training Institute, echoes the 
importance of transporting critical patients in need of immediate medical intervention 
having priority over decontamination needs in the aftermath of a radiological incident.  
As part of the strategic plan to develop a radiation response protocol, an 
investigation into recommended “Best Practices” for the response to radiation 
emergencies including the local, state and federal levels will be essential to identify and 
develop a comprehensive protocol.  The development of the Sacramento Regional 
Radiation Response Protocol will be developed by a subcommittee of the Consortium of 
Technical Responders (CTR) and critiqued by the membership to ensure that all 
stakeholder agencies have input into the process.  The outcome of a CTR 
approved/sponsored policy will provide “tipping point” direction to community policy 
makers to assist in driving support of the plan based on the credibility of the CTR 
expertise.  The leg work of the protocol development will be composed of a small 
working group to ensure that the direction of the plan maintains momentum, but quality 
control and protocol input will be provided by the larger body.   
I. RADIATION RESPONSE PROTOCOL DEVELOPMENT WILL 
INCLUDE 
• Fact finding as to current policies. 
• Assessment of current capabilities (SWOC). 
• Determination of best practices regarding all relative aspects of radiation response 
for the region.    
• Analysis of action steps to meet deficiencies, including equipment, training, 
staffing, funding and policy considerations. 
• Draft a strategic plan addressing a radiation protocol for consideration by the 
CTR. 
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• Modify protocol as required to meet the needs of stakeholders. 
• Assign responsible/accountable personnel to drive the strategic plan, with 
measurable goals of implementation. 
J. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL 
The full participation and “buy in” of stakeholder agencies will be essential to the 
development and implementation of a radiation response protocol within the Sacramento 
region.  The success of the radiation response protocol will include the inclusion of senior 
stakeholder agency policy makers in the development of the protocol, thereby gaining not 
only a commitment to the process, but self directed, voluntary participation by individual 
agencies.  
1. Overview of the Stakeholder Agencies and the Committees Needed for 
the Development and Implementation of a Radiation Response 
Protocol. 
The stakeholder agencies have been organized into three separate working 
committees which address operation and strategic issues facing each discipline within the 
region.  It is important to understand the intended mission of each of these groups in 
terms of planning and implementing of a radiation response protocol. 
a. The First Committee to Address is Called the Consortium of 
Technical Responders (CTR), Sacramento Chapter 
The CTR is a strategic committee whose stated mission is to address 
technical response issues facing the Sacramento Region.  The CTR is composed of the 
following agencies: 
• Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District 
• Sacramento City Fire District 
• Roseville Fire Department 
• California Highway Patrol 
• Sacramento Sheriff Department 
• Sacramento City Police Department 
• Roseville Police Department 
• Sacramento County Environmental 
Management Division 
• Sacramento County Public Health 
Department 
• Placer County Public Health 
Department 
• Terrorism Early Warning Group 
• California National Guard, 95th Civil 
Support Team 
• FBI, Sacramento Office 
• California Office of Emergency 
Services 
• Transportation Safety Administration 
(Sacramento International Airport) 
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
• Port of Sacramento 
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• Aerojet Corporation 
• California State University, Sacramento 
• University of California, Davis 
 
b. The Next Committee to Include in the Radiation Protocol Will Be 
the Regional Terrorist Threat Assessment Center’s (RTTAC), 
“Tactical Commanders Working Group” 
This group meets to discuss tactical and operational issues regarding 
terrorism response.  The tactical commanders group has many of the same members in 
the CTR, but also has lower level operational commanders who discuss cross-discipline 
scenarios.  Managers from emergency response disciplines such as EMS, EOD, Hazmat, 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), FBI, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), 
TEWG and UASI make up this working group. 
c. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Working Group 
The WMD Working Group is principally composed of local fire agency 
representatives who were originally assimilated to address decontamination issues 
specific to WMD response.  The WMD Working Group was founded in September, 
2003.  The focus of the group has since been modified to address additional operational 
areas such as WMD detection/protection issues and has expanded to include the members 
from the Terrorism Early Warning Group and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
representatives.  A subgroup of the WMD working group has been tasked with assessing 
the regional hazardous materials response team’s capabilities to reflect the recent changes 
in the FIRESCOPE, Hazardous Materials Team Typing requirements necessary to meet 
WMD response compliance. 
2. Sequence of Development of the Radiation Response Protocol 
The primary development of the radiation response protocol will be the 
responsibility of the CTR, radiation working group, with a point of contact being 
Battalion Chief Mark Wells from the Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District with the 
technical and expert assistance of Dr. Jerrold Bushberg from the University of California, 
Davis.  Additional working group members representing other affiliated CTR agencies 
will assist in developing the protocol.  A background document will be developed based 
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on the research of best practices regarding radiation response.  This document will 
include a gap analysis of current capabilities and deficient policies as compared to local, 
state, national and international standards and practices.   
The periodic drafts/changes to the radiation response protocol will be brought to 
the CTR members during regular meetings to address stakeholder concerns.  By early fall 
of 2006, the finalized radiation response protocol will be submitted for endorsement to 
the CTR.  The importance of this endorsement is to give the proposed document the 
authority of the stakeholder agencies in the region, credibility of the document regarding 
the science and technical nature regarding radiation response and to facilitate multi-
discipline “buy in” towards the response protocol. 
Once the CTR gives the initial endorsement, the proposed protocol will be 
submitted to the Sacramento Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) represented agencies. 
The Sacramento UASI is composed of regional response agencies within Sacramento 
County, southern Placer County and eastern Yolo County, all having response 
responsibilities and agreements within the Sacramento urban area. The individual 
agencies of the UASI will have the ability to dissent from the proposed protocol, but at 
this stage of the development process, their dissention will be to the larger body which 
has both established authority and credibility to make the recommendation.  At the same 
time, the protocol will be presented to the RTTAC “Tactical Commanders,” and the 
WMD working group.  The strategy behind this protocol implementation is to initiate 
dialog at multiple levels within the various response agencies.  The momentum generated 
at the operational level parallel to the strategic/policy level will facilitate the self directed, 
volunteer spirit within the ranks to ensure that the protocol is successfully implemented.  
K. PILOT INITIATIVE TO IMPLEMENT THE PROTOCOL 
1. Equipment Acquisition for Response Protocol 
The procurement of the necessary equipment will need to be accomplished in a 
modular format due to the associated costs and funding limitations.  The coordination of 
existing resources will be the primary focus during the initial implementation phase of 
the response protocol.  The fire agencies, hospitals and some law enforcement agencies, 
have the necessary equipment in current inventories, and are in need of only a protocol to 
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coordinate the necessary response strategies.  Additionally, purchase of a minimum 
number of detection/dosimeter devices will be required to equip supervisory personnel 
for response agencies which do not currently have the detection/dosimeter capability.  
This strategy will have several benefits.  First, the training of supervisory personnel 
during the initial phase will create a resource of “train-the-trainers” which will be 
beneficial during the following phases of implementation.  Second, having the “buy in” 
of supervisors will reinforce the importance of the response protocol to the rank-and-file.  
Third, the equipment will be available and deployed across all response agencies during 
the initial stages of an incident which is ultimately a key element in the response 
protocol.  Fourth, the technological advancements in detection and dose monitoring are 
developing rapidly.  The modular purchase of the proposed equipment will ensure that 
advancements in future technology will be realized locally.  The future deployment of 
said technology may be realigned amongst disciplines having a greater exposure to the 
radiation hazard during an incident.  The greater exposure can be defined as having 
response responsibilities in the exclusion zones, including resources such as hazmat 
response teams, decontamination personnel, medical response resources, or tactical 
elements of law enforcement.  Accordingly, the older technology may be redistributed to 
support zone personnel such as perimeter security, transportation assets or command 
staff. 
2. Training Needs to Implement the Protocol 
a. The Initial Training 
The Initial training will focus on the leadership positions from the 
response disciplines to facilitate awareness of the protocol, and to educate supervisors as 
to the recommendations of the radiation response protocol. This will be facilitated by a 
comprehensive training video that can be viewed in a short briefing to ensure that busy 
policy makers have the opportunity view the material.  The video will be facilitated by 
members of the CTR to reinforce the multi-disciplined approach, available on asset web 
servers or CD distribution. 
b. The Second Phase of Training 
The second phase training requirements will include awareness level 
training for all regional responders and hospital emergency personnel.  The training will 
 77
encompass an awareness level training, to ensure personnel who have not received 
specific radiation training will at least understand that there is a response protocol and 
have a baseline understanding of the associated hazards of radiation.  This will benefit the 
region by reducing the “fear” component of radiation terrorism and ultimately increase 
the awareness and response to radiation emergencies.  Radiation training will be 
incorporated into the quarterly WMD training for all regional response agencies to 
maintain currency in radiation issues.  
c. The Third Phase of Training 
The third phase of training will be for personnel currently equipped with 
detection and dosimeter capability in addition to the regional supervisors of agencies with 
recently acquired radiation detection/dosimeter equipment purchased on the initial 
equipment purchase.  The training of this group will be accomplished by utilizing a 
shared training curricula facilitated by a multi-disciplined training force.  The curricula 
will be approved by the California National Guard training division to ensure that grant 
funding can be supplied to facilitate training demands.   The UASI will be the point of 
contact to facilitate this training utilizing the WMD grant funding.  Practical exercises to 
reinforce regional training will be conducted on a routine basis.  As equipment becomes 
available, and is distributed to regional agencies, more advanced training will be 
facilitated.  Phase three will be repeated each time an equipment installment is received.  
The distribution of received equipment will be facilitated by the CTR in combination 
with the WMD response coordinator.  Agencies will be triaged as to which will receive 
the necessary equipment first, based on theoretical involvement in a radiation incident. 
d. The Fourth Phase of Training 
The fourth phase of training will be to initiate a public education campaign 
to actively distribute the message of hazards and the associated “facts” of radiation.  This 
message will be in conjunction with the regional homeland security office and will have 
the desired effect of potentially “immunizing” the public from the “fear” of radiological 
terrorism.  This education campaign will be multi-faceted to include public education, 
civic groups, professional organizations, and the media to mention a few. 
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e. The Final Phase of Training 
The final phase of training will include long-term, re-occurring radiation 
training based on nationally recognized multi-discipline curricula such as the MERRTT 
training program for emergency response personnel or curricula developed by the Centers 
for Disease Prevention for health care providers. 
L. SUMMARY 
The implementation of the radiation response protocol will rely on credibility of 
the process and recognized science regarding response capabilities to radiation incidents.  
Once a protocol is developed, a comprehensive strategy to apply the specifics of the 
protocol will be necessary to ensure that the regional protocol translates to a regional 
operational capability.  Effective communication, delegation and regional commitment 


















X. SACRAMENTO REGION, FIRST RESPONDER, RADIATION 
RESPONSE PROTOCOL 
A. RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE 
1. Purpose 
This protocol is designed to provide operational guidance for managing a 
radiological incident.  This document will apply to all aspects of radiological emergency 
response including day-to-day industrial response as well as response to an intentional 
radiation release such as a terrorist attack.  Due to the nature of a large-scale radiation 
incident, the protocol is intended for use by allied response stakeholders and can be 
utilized as a regional guideline for radiation response. 
2. Scope 
Law enforcement agencies assume responsibility of incident commander for 
hazardous materials within Sacramento County.  As an example, the California Highway 
Patrol has jurisdiction on roadways in the unincorporated areas of the county, where as 
the Sacrament Sheriff’s Department has jurisdiction on private property in the 
unincorporated areas. The City of Sacramento is an exception, where the fire department 
is the incident commander for hazardous materials as provided by the Sacramento City 
charter.  Additionally, the City of Roseville Fire Department has jurisdiction for 
hazardous materials in the City of Roseville which is in Placer County, but is in the 
operational area of Sacramento.   
The responsibility of the fire departments during a radiological incident include 
rescue, fire control, limit the spread of radiological contamination, decontamination of 
victims and equipment, medical triage, medical treatment, medical transportation, hazmat 
containment/stabilization, and initiation of appropriate notifications up to and including 
local, state, and federal resources.  Additionally, depending on the size and scope of the 
incident, the fire department will be an integral part of a unified command.  Commanders 
must recognize that all incidents begin as local incidents and must initiate protocols that 
provide for the life safety of the local population and protect emergency service 
personnel.  These local protocols must incorporate the goals of federal response agencies 
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to provide for a smooth transition from local to federal control, depending on the scope of 
the incident, and provide for response protocols to ensure timely patient treatment and 
emergency response.  The initial coordination of cleanup or remediation processes 
following a radiological incident will be facilitated by the County of Sacramento, 
Environmental Management Division.  Stakeholder agencies may be called upon to 
collaborate in the planning and execution of the cleanup/remediation process. 
In addition to incident command responsibilities, law enforcement (LE) agencies 
will facilitate, but not be limited to, perimeter security, site access/control lines, and 
provide force protection.  Additionally, special operations components of regional LE 
agencies may participate in joint entries with HMRT personnel to mitigate/identify 
mutual hazards such as additional explosive devices, on site assailants or provide force 
protection in the exclusion zone.   
B. RADIATION RESPONSE SCENARIOS 
The emergency response to a radiation event can be anticipated in several 
scenarios: 
• Industrial accidents during normal day-to-day handling, or transportation 
of radioactive materials. 
• Intentional sabotage of storage or transportation vessels containing 
radioactive materials for malicious purpose.  This may include nuclear 
facilities such as, power plants or industrial facilities.176 
• Detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon such as nuclear artillery shells, 
land mines, “suit case” bombs, etc.  Tactical nuclear weapons from the 
former Warsaw Pact countries arsenal could theoretically be used 
conventionally by terrorist groups if they fall into the wrong hands.  
“Russia continues to deploy a number of its most portable nuclear 
weapons on its front lines, where security controls are the weakest.”177  
• The distribution of radioactive materials via a “dirty bomb” (Radiation 
Dispersal Device).  The term “dirty bomb” is a slang term, originated by 
                                                 
176 Ferguson et al., Four Faces, 3. 
177 Ibid., 1. 
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the news media, and used to describe a radioactive material packaged with 
explosives for the intended purpose of spreading radiation.178   
• Radiation Exposure Device that consists of a radiation source positioned 
to expose unsuspecting victims to harmful levels of radiation. 
• Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)-the formation of a nuclear-yield 
reaction that can be an improvised weapon with acquired nuclear 
materials, or modification to a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon.179  
• Improvised methods of distributing radiation by utilizing liquid sprayers 
or other mechanical means to spread radiation contamination.  
C. TYPES OF RADIATION AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
Alpha Radiation:  Particulate cat ion, consisting of two protons and two neutrons 
which will not pass through a piece of paper or the dead layer of intact skin.  Alpha 
radiation can travels approximately 1-2 inches in air and is primarily an internal 
inhalation or absorption hazard. 
Beta Radiation:  Smaller than alpha particles, beta radiation can, depending on 
their energy travel up to 10 feet in air, and can penetrate the intact skin, making beta 
radiation both an external and internal hazard.  Shielding can be accomplished with 
plastic, glass, and foil. (Structural firefighting turnout gear is effective for blocking beta 
radiation.) 
Gamma and X-rays:  Electromagnetic radiation, that travels at the speed of light.  
Gamma radiation can easily penetrate protective clothing; therefore gamma radiation is 
considered an external and internal exposure hazard. Shielding can be accomplished by 
lead, steel, and concrete.    
Neutron Radiation:  High-speed particulate matter traveling at the speed of light.  
There are only limited numbers of radionuclide that are natural emitters of neutron 
radiation.  Neutron radiation is associated with a nuclear fission event such as a 
detonation of a nuclear weapon.  Deposits energy in hydrogenous materials such, as fat 
and water and thus, is an external and internal radiation hazard. 
                                                 
178 Health Physics Society, "Weapon of Mass Destruction.” 
179 Ibid. 
 82
1. Terminology for First Responders Regarding Radiation 
Electromagnetic radiation: Is defined by the modular emergency response 
radiological transportation training program (MERRTT) as visible light, heat, radio 
waves, and microwaves which are low level radiation energy which is referred to as non-
ionizing radiation.  High energy radiation is referred to as ionizing radiation.  Ionizing 
radiation is of sufficient energy to eject an electron from an atom, thereby changing the 
electron configuration of the atom and thus its chemical properties.  This is the initiating 
event that can ultimately lead to biological damage and the potential adverse health 
consequences of ionizing radiation. 
Radiation physical half-life (Tp1/2):  the time required for a quantity of a 
radionuclide to decay (i.e., transform) by one-half. Some radionuclides have a Tp1/2 of a 
few hours (e.g. Tc-99m used widely in Nuclear Medicine- Tp1/2=6 hrs), or many years 
(e.g. Cs-137 used in instrument calibration facilities Tp1/2-30 yrs and  U-238 found in 
nature Tp1/2= 4.5 billion years.180  
Radioactive material: Any material that spontaneously emits ionizing radiation.181 
Radioactive contamination: Radioactive material where it is not intended.182  
Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE):  The sum of the internal and external 
doses of radiation exposure. 
ALARA: Acronym for "as low as (is) reasonably achievable." Means making 
every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to ionizing radiation as far below the dose 
limits as practical, taking into account the state of technology, the cost of incremental 
reductions in dose, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, regarding the  
utilization of radioactive material in the public interest   
Inverse Square Law: The relationship that states that electromagnetic radiation 
intensity is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from a point source. Thus  
reducing the distance from a radiation source by 1/2 increases the exposure rate four 
                                                 
180 Health Physics Society, "Weapon of Mass Destruction.” 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid., 2-8. 
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times.  The same law works in reverse, whereby increasing the distance from a radiation 
source by a factor of 2 reduces the exposure rate four fold. 
Fissile Material: Any material in which neutrons can cause a fission reaction. The 
three primary fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239.  
Low Specific Activity (LSA): Radioactive material with limited amounts of 
radioactivity relative to the amount of the material.  An example would be uranium or 
thorium ores, mill tailings or contaminated earth.183  
Special form radioactive material: Can be either a single, solid piece of material, 
or a sealed capsule that can be opened only by destroying the capsule.  Special form 
material is considered to be non-dispersible during accident conditions. 184  Special form 
material should not be confused with “Special Nuclear Material” which is plutonium, 
uranium-233, or uranium enriched in isotopes uranium-233 or urnium-235.185 
Surface contaminated objects: Solid object that is not radioactive in of it self, but 
has radioactive contamination on its surface. 
D. DISPATCH GUIDELINES 
The Sacramento Regional Fire Emergency Communication Center (SRFECC) 
will dispatch resources in accordance with existing policies and procedures unless 
otherwise requested to modify the response criteria by the incident commander.  The 
initial response to a hazardous materials incident is a Level I hazardous materials 
dispatch which assigns one fire engine to the incident.  The early recognition and 
subsequent elevation of the incident by the initial arriving unit is the key to effective 
radiation response. 
E. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS 
Incident commanders must understand that all emergencies start locally and will 
be managed by local responders until outside resources arrive on scene.  The requested 
radiological resources from state and federal resources may have a delayed arrival of 
                                                 
183 Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training, 8-7. 
184 Ibid. 
185 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Special Nuclear Material.” 
http://www.nrc.gov/material/sp-nucmaterials.html [Accessed September 3, 2006]. 
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several hours.  Local commanders must initiate notifications and understand the 
associated roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders as the incident escalates, to 
function within the response protocol appropriately. 
The initial actions by emergency responders will follow established guidelines for 
hazardous materials response.  The initial actions should incorporate the following 
objectives: 
Safety:  Utilize time, distance and shielding to protect responders 
Isolation:  Deny access to the area of involvement 
Notifications:  Notify the appropriate resources, or response agencies.  Declare a 
level two hazardous material incident which will initiate the response of a hazardous 
materials response team, overhead special operations personnel, in addition to public 
health, and Sacramento County hazmat personnel. 
Identification of the hazard by utilization of U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) placards/labels, shipping papers, material data safety sheets and/or dialog with the 
responsible party.  The DOT guidebook is an excellent resource to provide emergency 
response guides for initial actions until qualified a hazardous materials response team 
(HMRT) arrives on scene to provide further guidance.  
Regional HMRT teams will arrived and develop control zones and identify the 
radionuclides involved.  The early identification of the radiation source will assist in 
determination of early health care intervention strategies.  This information will be 
forwarded to local, state and federal emergency response agencies having jurisdiction to 
enhance facilitation of technical information and for use in early strategic planning for 
the incident. 
1. Terrorism Incident 
For the safety of first responders, any response to an explosion should alert 
emergency personnel to a possibility of a potential terrorism incident. The emergency 
response resources must be aware of the potential for additional explosive devices 
designed to incapacitate the emergency personnel responding to the scene, operating on 
scene or commanding the incident.   
 85
Items of consideration while in route to the scene should include the time of day; 
nature of the occupancy of the incident, (i.e. high profile occupancy such as a federal 
building, courthouse, school, hospital, defense installation, financial center etc.); and the 
current threat assessment disseminated throughout the region by the Terrorism Early 
Warning Group.  Upon recognition of a suspicious incident, Fire Dispatch will be 
notified to make the appropriate notifications to the Terrorism Early Warning Group 
(TEWG), and the Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC).   
The term “terrorist act” or “terrorism” should not be utilized in the initial stages of 
the emergency until the terrorism nexus is known, and then disclosed by the appropriate 
law enforcement agency.  A radiation emergency that is deemed to be of an intentional 
nature, will initiate the immediate involvement of the FBI, who will assume the role of 
the lead federal agency.  
2. Detection/Dosimeter Equipment 
To respond safely to a radiation incident, responders must have detection 
capability to determine if they are working in a radiation area.  Stakeholder agency 
emergency response equipment have been issued electronic dosimeters  The purpose of 
the radiation dosimeter is to enable each unit to utilize the dosimeter to alert for the 
presence of radiation, and to serve as a dose meter for unit personnel during initial 
operations requiring personnel to enter radiation fields to perform emergency duties such 
as rescue, or firefighting operations.  The deployment of the dosimeter will be the 
responsibility of the company officer or senior crew member if an officer is not assigned. 
When a dosimeter alarms, the radiation rate/dose should be immediately recorded.  
This information must be relayed to the incident commander immediately.  The 
dosimeter rate parameters are preset to alert at 1 mR (dose), or 100 mR/hr (rate ).  An 
analogy to understand the difference between rate versus dose would be the speedometer 
on a vehicle.  The miles-per-hour would be “Rate”; the odometer would be “Dose.”  
These settings are well below harmful levels of radiation, but indicate a radiological 
source that would be present well above normal background radiation levels. It should be 
noted that these dosimeters are not designed to be a field survey instrument for radiation.  
Their purpose is to show the presence of radiation.  If the dosimeter alerts, responders 
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will utilize time, distance and shielding techniques (taught in the First Responder 
Operations course), isolate and deny entry, and elevate the response to a level two 
HAZMAT incident at a minimum.  The radiation dosimeters currently carried by the 
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District will monitor up to 500 R/hr, but do not detect 
alpha or beta radiation (due to the fact alpha and beta particles are not able to penetrate 
the housing of the device).  Therefore, it is important for first responders not to breathe 
the smoke or dust in the aftermath of an explosion or fire suspected of containing 
radioactive materials.  
The entry of personnel shall be limited to the absolute minimum number utilizing 
the ALARA principle.  Personnel shall wear full PPE, and SCBA until atmospheric 
monitoring indicates that downgrading to an APR or N95 filtering mask is appropriate 
and reduced protective clothing is sufficient for the hazards present.  It should be noted 
that radiation hazards may be associated with chemical or other hazards requiring 
protective equipment for the associated hazardous of the incident in totality, not just the 
radiation component. 
3. Radiological Contamination vs. Radiation Exposure  
First arriving emergency personnel must understand the difference between 
radiation exposures versus radiation contamination. 
• Radiation is energy that is emitted by a radiological material; much like a 
wave of light illuminates an opaque object.  Radiation energy leads to 
radiation exposure, but once the personnel are removed or shielded from 
the radioactive source, the exposure is stopped.  Additionally, creating 
distance between the source and the person reduces the exposure by what 
is know as the inverse square law.  (e.g., double the distance form the 
source; reduce the exposure by four fold.)  The related radiation dose that 
is accumulated (measured in rem) is based on how long the exposure 




• Radiation contamination is radioactive material that is outside of its 
container or normal state of containment, in or on the surface of an object 
or distributed in the environment.  If objects or personnel have been 
contaminated by radioactive material, they will continue to be exposed 
until the contamination is removed.   
F. ESTABLISHING CONTROL ZONES 
The utilization of the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) is appropriate for 
the initial establishment of isolation and evacuation distances.  ERG 2004 recommends 
isolation or evacuation of: 
• 75 feet (25 meters)- isolation from a spill or leak 
• 330 feet (100 meters)- down wind evacuation of a large spill or leak 
• 1000 feet (300 meters)- evacuation for a large fire 
Regional Hazardous Material Response Teams will be tasked with establishing 
control zones related to radiation exposure rates at specific measurement levels to control 
personnel access and the spread of contamination.   
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency establishes the radiation 
contamination threshold at twice the background radiation measurement for a particular 
area.  This value is utilized to measure radiological contamination and should not be 
confused with the establishment of control lines based on radiation activity. 
1. Exclusion Zone (Formerly Referred to as the “Hot Zone”) 
The exclusion zone is the area in the immediate vicinity of a hazardous material 
release where there is contamination, or probable contamination will occur for personnel 
working in the area.  Control lines are established to exclude personnel from working in 
the exclusion zone without the proper protective equipment.  The exclusion zone, for 
radiation, is recommended at 2 mR/hr based on the size and scope of the incident.  In a 
large-scale radiation incident, one that encompasses a large geographic area, or high 
levels of radiation, commanders must evaluate risk versus gain in the development of 
control zones.  Remaining consistent with the dose rate recommendations, all activities 
can be performed so long as dose levels remain below 5 rem.  The current exclusion zone 
is established at 2mR/hr.  At the rate of 2mR/hr, responders can work in the radiation 
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environment for 3 weeks continually before dose rates reach 1 rem, 15 weeks before 
exposure levels reach 5 rem.  Due to the scope of the incident, commanders may need to 
move operational areas forward and adjust the exclusion zone threshold to manage an 
incident properly while remaining consistent with the ALARA principle.      
2. Contamination Reduction Zone (Formerly Referred to as the “Warm 
Zone”) 
The area where personnel/victims/equipment transition from the exclusion zone to 
the support zone.  Decontamination operations are performed in this area to control the 
spread of contamination from the exclusion zone. 
3. Support Zone (Formerly Referred to as the “Cold Zone”) 
The area where command and support activities are facilitated to manage the 
incident. 
G. TRIAGE TREATMENT AND TRANSPORT OF RADIATION 
CASUALTIES 
1. Triage 
The initial assessment and triage of patients in a radiological environment will be 
assigned to first arriving emergency units utilizing the Sacramento County mass casualty 
protocol. Upon detection of a radiation incident, emergency personnel will don 
appropriate protective clothing at the direction of the incident commander and radiation 
detection/dosimeter equipment.  Patients will be assessed for medical needs, regardless of 
radiological contamination utilizing the simple triage and rapid treatment (START). 
2. Treatment 
National standards stated by the Department of Transportation, Emergency 
Response Guidebook, guide page 163 states under “First Aid”. “Medical problems take 
priority over radiological concerns; Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the 
injury; Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person; Injured persons 
contaminated by contact with released material are not a serious hazard to health care 
personnel, equipment or facilities; and ensure that medical personnel are aware of the 
material(s) involved, take precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of 
contamination.”186  
                                                 
186 U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, 2004 
Emergency Response Guidebook (Washington, D.C: Department of Transportation, 2004), 163. 
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3. Transportation 
The transport of immediate patients whether contaminated or clean, will not be 
delayed for decontamination actions provided that there is not a chemical or biological 
component to the contamination.  (Chemically-contaminated patients will be 
decontaminated prior to treatment or transportation.) Every effort to minimize the spread 
of radiation contamination will be made so long as the efforts do not delay transportation 
or medical treatment timelines.  Such techniques may include the removal of a patients 
clothing to remove up to ninety percent of radiation contamination.  Patients shall be 
wrapped in sheets to trap any remaining contamination and transportation assets will be 
prepared per MERRTT procedures to minimize contamination.  Use of an issued 
radiation dosimeter will be utilized by ambulance crew members, (one per unit) to ensure 
radiation dose limits do not exceed recommended levels.  The dosimeter shall be placed 
in the treatment area of the ambulance to ensure the device is protecting personnel in the 
closest proximity to the potential radiation contamination.  Ambulance personnel shall 
don, at minimum, universal precaution personal protective equipment (PPE) to include 
eye, respiratory protection, gloves and an outer disposable garment to enhance 
decontamination processes.  Utilization of the deployed biological PPE will facilitate the 
PPE requirements for radiation in addition to biological emergencies.  Utilizing the time, 
distance and shielding principles, personnel will reduce exposure to radiation to ALARA.  
Command staff should consider the utilization of dedicated “dirty” ambulances on 
an on-going basis, providing the contamination level of the ambulance does not exceed 
safe radiation exposure levels for personnel.  Limiting the number of ambulances and 
personnel that may require decontamination will ensure continuity of medical transport 
capability immediately following the incident and is consistent with the ALARA 
principle. It should be noted that the dedication of “dirty ambulances should only be 
utilized if it does not delay the transport of critical patients due to a limited response 
capability. Radiation contamination of an ambulance can be removed during cleanup or 
remediation efforts.  Often ordinary clean-up procedures will remove radioactive  
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contamination.187  Exposed personnel and equipment will be surveyed for radiological 
contamination and dose levels recorded for documentation purposes prior to being release 
from duty, or reassignment. 
4. Decontamination 
The specific nature of each event will dictate a course of action regarding the 
radiation decontamination procedures.  The following are guidelines to be balanced with 
specific incident considerations.  Incident specific considerations may include, but are not 
limited to; weather conditions, ambient temperature, additional hazardous 
materials/hazards associated with the incident, the logistical concerns of decontaminating 
large numbers of people in an expedient manner, and the geographic magnitude of the 
area of involvement. 
If resources allow, initial radiological survey procedures should be performed by 
trained personnel to detect contamination.    Personnel surveys can be performed at the 
direction of hazardous materials response team personnel.  Additionally, portable 
radiation monitors called “portal monitors” may be used for the screening of large 
numbers of victims.  Portal monitors can be accessed through the department of energy 
RAP teams or the National Guard Civil Support Teams.  Commanders must factor a time 
delay of specialized detection equipment into planning processes.  Additionally, 
improvisation may be required to survey large volumes of concerned populations.  The 
utilization of radiation detection equipment found in the private sector may be utilized 
with proper coordination/collaboration with civilian infrastructure.  An example would be 
the portal radiation monitors found at many hospital waste collection areas and at metal 
scrap yards to survey large numbers of concerned victims.  These facilities may become 
remote radiation survey centers utilized to minimize public hysteria or fear due to the 
possibility of being contaminated by radiation.   
Medical procedures should be ruled out if a person presents with above 
background radiation reading during a radiation survey.  Recent nuclear medicine or 
oncology procedures may be the source of the radiation.188  Such radionuclides will be 
                                                 
187Bushberg et al., “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism,” 17. 
188Ibid., 11. 
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detected by survey equipment utilized by emergency personnel.  Routine medical history 
inquiries should illuminate the legitimate presence these radiopharmaceuticals.  
Additionally, field personnel will not be able to decontaminate internal radiation 
contamination.  Persons with internal radiation contamination should be referred to 
medical authorities for follow-up medical treatment. 
Recommendations for decontamination are made by the decontamination unit 
leader to the hazardous materials group supervisor. These recommendations are to be 
submitted to the incident commander at the unified command center.  Consideration of 
environmental factors, numbers of affected victims, nature of the contamination and 
resources available to perform decontamination should be evaluated prior to selection of 
a decontamination method.  It should be noted that decreasing off-site radiological 
contamination is a primary concern for emergency response personnel, but should be 
balanced with the threat posed and associated complications of the decontamination 
processes. 
Decontamination procedures minimize off-site consequences of radiological 
contamination.  The following decontamination control procedures are illustrated in the 
“Pre-Hospital Practices” module from the MERRTT program189 
Minimizing the spread of contamination while treating immediate patients 
who have not undergone a formal decontamination process: 
• Initiate ALS care as necessary 
• Remove clothing if appropriate 
• Wrap patient in a blanket to minimize contamination 
• Only expose areas required to assess and treat patient 
• If necessary, cut and remove the patients clothing away from the body 
being careful to avoid contamination to the unexposed skin 
• Properly contain all removed clothing by placing it in a sealable bag 
• Continue to reassess and monitor vitals while in route to a medical facility 
                                                 
189Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response, 16-6. 
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• Contact with the patient may result in transfer of contamination, change 
gloves as necessary 
Dry Field Decontamination: 
• Dry field decontamination should be the first line of contamination control 
• Dry field decontamination is performed in the contamination reduction 
zone, formerly known as the warm zone 
• Removes the majority of contaminates  
• Reduces the risks of contamination spread and inhalation hazard 
• Allows contaminates to be left in the affected area 
Wet Decontamination: 
Depending on the nature of the contamination and the recommendation of the 
decontamination unit leader, wet decontamination may be initiated to contain off-site 
radiation consequences.  Wet decontamination will be facilitated through the regional 
decontamination guidelines referenced in the Sacramento Regional WMD Working 
Group decontamination guide. 
H. MEDICAL FACILITY ACCEPTANCE OF CRITICALLY 
CONTAMINATED PATIENTS 
The presence of radiological contamination must be communicated throughout all 
stakeholder agencies associated with the incident.  The medical facility receiving patients 
from a radiological incident must be made aware of decontamination procedures 
performed prior to transport, or the immediate transport of an immediate patient who 
remains potentially contaminated.   
Current policies remain in effect for transportation of patients to appropriate 
medical facilities based on injuries, proximity and severity.  In a limited incident with a 
small number of patients, the number of hospitals impacted with contaminated patients 
should be held to the least number as possible.  The selection of these facilities should be 
coordinated through the disaster control facility, and will be limited to facilities with 
radiation policies in place.  Currently the hospitals of University of California at Davis, 
and Mercy San Juan hospitals have policies in place to handle radiological contaminated 
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patients appropriately.  Additionally, both facilities are regional trauma centers.  These 
facilities should be considered primarily.  It will be the goal of all regional hospitals to be 
able to handle radiation contaminated patients.  In a large scale incident, past experience 
has shown that a majority of patients presenting to medical facilities self present, and are 
not evaluated by emergency response personnel in the field.  The absence of a radiation 
response policy or lack of adequately trained personnel will not limit the inundation of 
hospital emergency departments by self reporting victims in the aftermath of a large 
radiation incident. 
1. Communication 
The communication between receiving hospitals and patient transportation assets 
should include the following information according to the MERRTT program: 
• Destination of patient and access to the facility.   
• Who will be assisting with the patient to include radiation safety personnel 
from the facility and other medical staff? 
• What role will ambulance personnel fulfill in the transfer?  The medical 
facility may want to limit the movement of ambulance personnel, who 
may be potentially contaminated, within the hospital 
2. Return to Service Considerations for Ambulance Personnel 
According to the MERRTT Program 
• Follow hospital and/or Radiation Authority direction upon arrival to the 
medical facility concerning all aspects of the transport, including dress 
down procedures and contamination containment 
• Ensure survey of ambulance for radiation contamination by appropriate 
authorities.  As noted in previous text, a “dirty” ambulance may be 
reutilized to transport other critical patients provided the contamination 
levels are kept ALARA.   
• Ensure personnel are surveyed by appropriate authorities and 
decontaminated as appropriate 
• Do not eat, drink, smoke or take anything orally until survey and 
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